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SUMMARY
To interconnect research facilities across wide geographic areas, network op-
erators deploy science networks, also referred to as Research and Education (R&E)
networks. These networks allow experimenters to establish dedicated circuits be-
tween research facilities for transferring large amounts of data, by using advanced
reservation systems. Intercontinental dedicated circuits typically require coordina-
tion between multiple administrative domains, which need to reach an agreement on
a suitable advance reservation. To enhance provisioning capabilities of multi-domain
advance reservations, we propose an architecture for end-to-end service orchestration
in multi-domain science networks that leverages software-defined networking (SDN)
and software-defined exchanges (SDX) for providing multi-path, multi-domain ad-
vance reservations. Our simulations show our orchestration architecture increases the
reservation success rate. We evaluate our solution using GridFTP, one of the most
popular tools for data transfers in the scientific community. Additionally, we pro-
pose an interface that domain scientists can use to request science network services
from our orchestration framework. Furthermore, we propose a federated auditing
framework (FAS) that allows an SDX to verify whether the configurations requested
by a user are correctly enforced by participating SDN domains, whether the con-
figurations requested are correctly removed after their expiration time, and whether
configurations exist that are performing non-requested actions. We also propose an





Modern scientific instruments (e.g., particle accelerators, large telescopes, and genome
sequencers) generate large datasets that are analyzed at supercomputing centers, typ-
ically hundreds of kilometers away from the original research facility. To interconnect
research facilities with supercomputing centers across long distances, network oper-
ators deploy science networks or Research and Education (R&E) networks. These
networks allow experimenters to establish dedicated circuits between research facil-
ities by using advance reservation systems [18]. These systems are deployed on top
of science networks and manage network resources in a coarse grained fashion (i.e.,
source and destination endpoints, required bandwidth, and duration of the reser-
vation). Examples of advance reservation systems are the advanced layer 2 service
(AL2S) of Internet2 [58] and the on-demand secure circuits and advance reservation
system (OSCARS) of the Energy Science Network (ESNet) [77].
In the case of intercontinental dedicated circuits, network operators may take from
days to several weeks for planning and provisioning a circuit over multiple science
networks, because these tasks are typically done manually [56]. The use of advance
reservation systems for requesting international or intercontinental dedicated circuits,
combined with novel approaches to networking, such as software-defined networking
(SDN) will significantly reduce provisioning times of science network services [23, 56].
However, as these reservations are defined by endpoints, duration, and bandwidth,
the scheduling of resources is not flexible; that is, a reservation request will fail if
the exact amount of bandwidth between two endpoints is not available within the
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specified time frame [6]. This problem is dramatically amplified for intercontinental
dedicated circuits, because the reservation spans multiple administrative domains,
and participant domains have to reach an agreement on a suitable advance reser-
vation that fulfills the requirements of the original request. Furthermore, despite a
majority of domains having available resources for the reservation, if only one domain
is not able to provide the requested resources, a multi-domain advance reservation
will fail. Moreover, the success rate of finding an agreement decreases as the number
of participants with limited bandwidth resources increases. This problem is analogous
to trying to reserve a multi-legged flight with airlines that are not part of the same
consortium and do not share flight schedules.
Another challenge is that advance reservations terminate at the WAN border
router of each domain, and participant domains are interconnected at single junc-
tion points [98, 109]. As a result, multi-domain advance reservations are generally
provisioned over single paths, adding more complexity to the problem of finding an
agreement on the advance reservation. Furthermore, a data transfer has to compete
with campus LAN traffic to reach the advanced reservation at the WAN border router
of the research facility.
A secondary effect of non flexible scheduling of resources and high failure rates on
reservations is the impact in user’s productivity. Every time a reservation fails, the
systems forces a user (a scientist) into a cycle of trial and error until a suitable time
frame is found. Furthermore, the interface for requesting these types of reservations is
very complex for domain-expert scientists who are not network operators. Arguably,
many of these interfaces were developed by network operators, for network operators.
Furthermore, manual provisioning of these connections, which could take from sev-
eral days to several weeks [56], is sometimes limited by configuration overhead, poor
scalability, and poor testing interfaces [98].
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The federated nature of R&E exchange points is based on trust between par-
ticipant domains. However, an old adage says “trust, but verify”, so a responsible
network operator wants to verify if his or her request have been enforced by domains
participating on a multi-domain advance reservation. Moreover, some participants of
the multi-domain advance reservation do not want to reveal internal topology infor-
mation while still proving that they correctly deployed the requested reservation.
Recently, software-defined exchanges (SDX) have emerged as a new kind of cyber-
infrastructure that allows independent administrative domains to share computing,
storage, and networking resources by leveraging SDN [20, 49]. By using an SDX
controller, network operators can program the fabric of an SDX in an agile way. We
posit that by inserting an SDX in the junction point between participant domains in
an intercontinental advance reservation, we will increase the success rate of finding
a multi-domain advance reservation. The initial benefit of adding SDXs to the ad-
vance reservation process is that we overcome the limitation of single-path advance
reservation (i.e., SDXs enable multi-domain, multi-path advance reservations). For
instance, we may have two SDXs connected through two different advance reservation
providers (e.g., WAN1 and WAN2) as shown in Figure 1, providing two independent
paths between a telescope and a supercomputer. As a result, an experimenter may
request half of the required bandwidth in each domain instead of requesting all the
bandwidth in a single domain and not taking advantage of the secondary path. An-
other benefit of the SDX approach is that we provide alternatives to multi-domain,
end-to-end advance reservation such as making reservations only at critical points or
combining advance reservation and DiffServ QoS. Moreover, an SDX infrastructure
will enable novel scheduling strategies that take advantage of the new infrastructure,
as well as novel science network services (e.g., multipath bandwidth splitting across
WANs, path migration, and multipoint-to-multipoint advance reservations). Addi-
tionally, an SDX will enable a federated auditing framework that allows verification of
3
Figure 1: SDX-enabled multi-domain, multipath advance reservations scenario, with
two SDXs connected through two different WANs, providing two independent paths
between a telescope and a supercomputer.
the following conditions: (1) whether configurations requested by users are correctly
enforced by participant SDN domains, (2) whether these configurations are correctly
removed after their expiration time, and (3) whether configurations exist that are
performing non requested actions. Furthermore, these verifications are conducted
without revealing internal information about the participating domains.
1.2 Architectural Approaches to a Science Network Software-
Defined Exchange
Thesis Statement: Given that current advance reservation systems present several
challenges for deploying multi-domain intercontinental circuits, this work posits that
by introducing SDXs in the reservation and provisioning process of intercontinental
circuits, we are able to create multi-path, multi-domain advance reservations, which
enhances the performance of science data transfers over traditional methods reported
in the literature, while increasing the success rate of reservations, providing more
intuitive interfaces to end users, and enabling auditing capabilities to network oper-
ators. To take advantage of an SDX-enabled advance reservation system for science
networks, we develop an orchestration framework for advance reservation systems and
SDXs that can provide access control to circuit reservations, flexible reservation re-




The contributions of this dissertation are the following:
1. An architecture for intercontinental multi-domain, multi-path ad-
vance reservations in science networks that leverages SDN and SDX. The
architecture is composed of an orchestrator that request services from partici-
pant domains and SDXs. We evaluated our proposed architecture using single-
path vs. multi-path advance reservations over multiple domains, and the data
transfer tools that the scientific community currently uses. Our architecture
allows us to evaluate the impact of incorporating SDXs in science networks
through:
(a) A negotiation protocol for multi-domain, multi-path advance reser-
vations, that allows an orchestrator to compose end-to-end services that
take advantage of alternative paths provided by the enriched connectivity
of SDXs. Our simulations using this negotiation protocol indicate that
the reservation success increases in multi-path systems by splitting the
bandwidth reservation over independent participant domains.
(b) Architectural approaches at the SDX level that enable novel science
network services, while enhancing the performance of science data transfers
over traditional approaches. We evaluated SDX-rule provisioning options
and bandwidth splitting strategies that allow data transfer protocols to
take advantage of multipath bandwidth splitting.
2. We propose an interface that users and other systems can use to request
science network services from our orchestration framework.
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3. We propose a federated auditing framework for configuration verification
in an SDX, a communication protocol that allows an SDX to query participant
domains without exposing internal information, and include an initial proof-
of-concept deployment of our federated auditing framework. In this context,
we also propose a system that uses SDN and tokens to strongly bind an
end-to-end flow to the user or application that requested an advance reservation.
1.4 Literature Survey
1.4.1 Advance Reservation Systems
Experimenters request and manage connections over a high-speed wide area network
(WAN) using advance reservation systems [18]. Advance reservation connections are
defined by the endpoints they connect, the requested bandwidth, the start time,
and the end time. Generally, an advance reservation ends at the border router that
connects a site to the WAN, and it is identified by a VLAN ID within the WAN.
If a site does not have a high-speed dedicated network (e.g., Science DMZ [28]),
scientific flows have to compete with campus LAN traffic before reaching the advance
reservation in the border router. Currently, the operator can extend an advance
reservation to the end host by manually extending VLANs on each site. This manual
provisioning of VLANs on site, however, can take several days. For instance, the
coordination of the provisioning process without automation may take between five
and 45 days [56]. Additionally, as reservations are defined by the start time, the end
time, and bandwidth, the scheduling of resources is not flexible; that is, a reservation
request will fail if the exact amount of bandwidth is not available within the specified
time frame [6, 98].
Ibarra et al. [56] described the deployment of SDN and OpenFlow on the AmLight
international research and education network, which promotes collaboration research
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between the United States and Latin America, with the goals of improving opera-
tions efficiency and providing network programmability, which were provided by the
FlowSpace Firewall (FSF) [43] and the Open Exchange Software Suite (OESS) SDN
controller [44]. With the new SDN AmLight, the provisioning time for a Layer 2 cir-
cuit that involves up to three domains decreased from five days and ten emails to less
than two minutes and zero emails. Although SDN Amlight also automates provision-
ing of multidomain network reservations, its definition of a domain is a nationwide
network (e.g., Internet2 and ESNet in the United Stated and RNP in Brazil). In con-
trast, our focus includes smaller domains such as national laboratories and university
campuses and end-to-end reservations, as we are more concerned with automating
provisioning for the last mile between the border router and the endpoint.
Tepsuporn et al. [98] tested the use of end-to-end Layer 2 paths for large dataset
transfers over an existing deployment called DYNES (Dynamic Network System)
[109]. The DYNES system uses OESS and OSCARS in multiple domains to establish
dedicated Layer 2 circuits. While OESS is an intra-domain SDN controller that con-
trols switches using OpenFlow [75], OSCARS supports inter-domain services. The
authors identified limitations with configuration overhead, scalability, path provision-
ing, and testing. For instance, a failed path setup attempt in OSCARS forces a user
to wait 15 minutes before issuing a new request [98].
To overcome the rigidity of advance reservation systems when a reservation request
fails, Balman et al. [6] developed a novel approach for path-finding in time-dependent
networks by taking advantage of user-provided parameters of the total volume (in
bytes) and time constraints. Their algorithm finds alternate allocation possibilities,
including the earliest time for completion, or the shortest transfer duration, with a
quadratic complexity that depends on the number of nodes and existing reservations.
They implemented their algorithm and tested it in the OSCARS reservation system
as a flexible reservation service, the results of their test confirmed their theoretical
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predictions about transfer performance.
1.4.2 Software-defined Networking (SDN)
Under the software-defined networking (SDN) paradigm [80, 64, 55], the control and
data planes of network devices are decoupled. This separation enables global network
programmability, rapid innovation, and independent evolution of control and data
planes. The SDN architecture is divided into three layers: the infrastructure layer,
which represents the data plane; the control layer, which represents the control plane;
and the application layer, which represents network applications (e.g., switching, rout-
ing, or load balancing). The data plane is composed of many forwarding devices or
SDN-enabled switches. The control plane is a logically centralized entity, generally
known as an SDN controller that could be composed of a single server or several
distributed SDN controllers. The SDN controller communicates with SDN switches
through the southbound interface and with network applications through the north-
bound interface. A west-east interface that enables communication between several
SDN controllers within the same administrative domain may be added. Furthermore,
if these controllers belong to independent administrative domains, a multidomain
SDN [98] that can be used to automate the provisioning of advance reservations is
also possible [56].
An industry standard for the SDN southbound interface is the OpenFlow protocol
[75, 81] that is also the most widely deployed. It works by installing match-action
policies in the flow table of OpenFlow-enabled switches. SDN switches that support
the OpenFlow protocol are implemented in both hardware and software. An example
of a software SDN switch or a virtual switch is Open vSwitch (OVS) [85], a widely used
switch in datacenters for network virtualization [63] that was designed for optimal
operation in hypervisors [85]. Although the network industry, however, has not yet
agreed on a standard for the northbound interface, its efforts are aligned with the
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development of intent-based networking interfaces [14, 66]. Intent-based networking
uses a prescriptive rather than descriptive approach to network configuration; that is,
network operators and applications describe a goal, and the SDN controller decides
how to implement it.
When SDN was proposed in 2008 by McKewon et al. [75], the authors assumed
a network composed of only switches and routers. This first assumption omitted
middleboxes and other common functions in computer networks. In a 2012 paper
about SDN shortcomings, Casado et al. [17] reflected on how these shortcomings
could be improved by using some ideas from multiprotocol label switching (MPLS).
The authors argued that an ideal network design should be simple, vendor neutral,
and future proof and thus proposed a network design composed of an edge and a core
fabric, each controlled by independent SDN controllers. In this approach, the edge
is responsible for complex network services and the core fabric handles basic packet
transport. One of the benefits is that edge and core control planes continue to evolve
separately.
SDN and Scientific Applications
Researchers have already proposed the use of SDN for enhancing scientific applica-
tion resource management and performance over a WAN connection. For instance,
the Lark project [108] proposed a flexible and fine-grained mechanism to manage
network resources in high-throughput computing (HTC) systems [7]. Using Linux
containers [70], virtual Ethernet devices, and SDN [108], Lark enables network re-
source management with per-job granularity for HTC systems such as HTCondor. In
this architecture, each job is assigned to a separate network namespace [69], and each
HTCondor node has a virtual switch (e.g., Open vSwitch or Linux bridge) that in-
terconnects network namespaces to physical interfaces. The work considers only jobs
running on the same node and allows users to actively change the network layer when
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they submit batch jobs. To demonstrate these capabilities, the authors developed a
bandwidth management system and a job aware OpenFlow controller and measured
the performance overhead for both implementations. Because of the creation and the
configuration of network namespaces, the authors reported a job startup overhead of
one second. However, as a typical HTC job duration is measured in hours, this delay
is negligible. Furthermore, the authors recognized that their SDN controller adds an
additional level of complexity to the system, reducing overall stability.
Researchers also use SDN to enhance scientific application resource management
and performance of a WAN connection by developing applications with network-
ing capabilities via end-to-end SDN (DANCES project) [52]. DANCES investigates
and develops the ability to add network bandwidth scheduling via SDN programma-
bility to selected cyber-infrastructure services and applications in extreme science.
DANCES [52] seeks to enhance the performance of cyberinfrastructure applications
(e.g., GridFTP [2] data transfers, SLASH2 [86] distributed file system data transfers,
and SCP) by adding network bandwidth scheduling via SDN. The project developed
a bandwidth management component called centralized OpenFlow and network gov-
erning authority (CONGA), whose main function is to receive bandwidth requests
from a resource manager or scheduling system and determine if the request can be
fulfilled. To determine if a request is accepted or rejected, CONGA utilizes two crite-
ria: (1) if resources are still available on the network, and (2) if the user is authorized
to request this amount of bandwidth.
Network Access Control and SDN
Network access control (NAC), standardized as IEEE 802.1X [57], is a common com-
puter security approach that authenticates endpoints and grants them access to a
computer network. NAC, whose main focus is policy enforcement, was one of the first
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applications developed for SDN [16, 78, 74, 106]. Casado et al. [16] proposed a se-
cure architecture for the networked enterprise (SANE) that defines a single protection
layer that governs all routing and access control decisions in the network. Similarly,
Nayak et al. [78] proposed Resonance, a system for securing enterprise networks us-
ing dynamic access control policies and network devices as enforcement points. Also
using SDN principles, FlowNAC [74] and FlowIdentity [106] adapt the IEEE 802.1X
protocol. While FlowNAC performs authorization by a set of pre-defined flow rules
per network service, FlowIndentity enforces a policy through a stateful role-based
firewall updated dynamically in the SDN controller.
To access network resources, NAC requires the authentication of users/devices
and further authorization following the AAA (authentication, authorization, and ac-
counting) framework [29]. A user obtains authentication by many means such as
passwords, certificates, and tokens, and authorization by three methods: an agent
sequence, in which a user/device contacts a AAA server; a pull sequence, in which
a user/device contacts a resource that then contacts the AAA server; and a push
sequence, in which a user/device contacts a AAA server, receives a ticket, and then
presents the ticket to a resource that also validates the token [102].
Gommans et al. [46] proposed a token-based access control mechanism for multi-
domain lightpath (i.e., a fiber optics path) reservations in research and education
networks. The authors identified and demonstrated three ways of enforcing access
control policies: using a token-based switch at the IP packet layer; including a token
in a specific field of RSVP-TE signaling protocol for GMPLS-based network at the
control plane; and implementing an authentication, authorization, and accounting
server, a token enforcement point, and a lightpath resource allocation system at
service layer signaling. However, while this work extended to multiple domains, it
did not use SDN because it had not been widely adopted.
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1.4.3 Software-defined Exchange Points (SDX)
A novel internetworking paradigm, software-defined exchange (SDX), allows multi-
ple independent administrative domains to share computing, storage, and networking
resources. Therefore, an SDX can be regarded as a next-generation advance reserva-
tion system. This effort is promoted mainly by users and operators of research and
education networks. Currently, networking researchers use SDX to incorporate SDN
technologies into the networking infrastructure of Internet exchange points (IXPs) [49]
and academic exchange points [73, 72]. Taking into account the exchanged networking
resources, we can classify SDX solutions as follows: (1) layer 3 SDXs, which exchange
BGP updates in Internet exchange points [49, 96]; (2) layer 2 SDXs [73, 72], which
exchange multi-domain Ethernet circuits in research and education networks; and (3)
SDN SDXs [15, 67], which interconnect SDN islands. In the following sub-sections we
provide more details about these three types of SDXs. For a more extensive review
of SDX architectures refer to [20], from which we also discuss the ideas pertaining to
the exchange of computing and storage resources.
Layer 3 SDX
A layer 3 SDX provides SDN capabilities to the switching fabric of an IXP. The main
characteristics of this kind of SDX is its handling of exchanges of BGP routes between
IXP participants, the layer 3 SDX requires a BGP process. The minimum additional
requirements are an SDN-enabled fabric, an SDN controller that installs flows be-
tween the participants, and a BGP process that listens to the BGP announcements
of participants. To enrich policies that can be defined by BGP, a policy manager is
recommended. Some examples of layer 3 SDXs are Cardigan [96], a distributed router
based on RouteFlow and a mesh of OpenFlow switches represented as a single logical
switch, and SDX [49], an SDN framework for improving the network management
capabilities of BGP participants in an IXP.
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Layer 2 SDX
According to definitions provided at the 23rd GENI Engineering Conference (GEC23),
a layer 2 SDX is mainly used in RENs to interconnect research facilities by using layer
2 technologies such as Ethernet VLANs over optical circuits. Arguably, a layer 2 SDX
is a redefinition of an advance reservation system. Following this assumption, we could
classify SDN-enabled advance reservation systems (e.g., AL2S and OSCARS) as layer
2 SDXs.
SDN SDX
The design objective of the SDN SDX is to interconnect SDN islands managed by in-
dependent administrative domains. Again, this definition shares many characteristics
of the advance reservation systems we presented in Section 1.4.1. However, while an
SDN SDX provides a broader view of the deployment of SDN flow rules within multi-
ple SDN domains, the SDX for scientific applications, the focus of this study, provides
a narrower scope of the deployment of SDN flow rules within collaborating scientific
facilities. Two ways of building an SDN SDX are utilizing either a centralized or peer-
to-peer architecture. A centralized SDN SDX architecture could be implemented in
one of three ways: (1) implementing a single logically centralized controller; (2) using
an intermediate slice manager such as FlowVisor[93] or FlowSpace Firewall[43] that
allows an external controller (i.e., the SDX controller) to manage a portion of each
participant’s network; or (3) creating a hierarchy of controllers with a local controller
at each exchange being managed by a separate higher-level controller. The second
way of building an SDN SDX, the peer-to-peer architecture, uses a west-east protocol
between controllers in the SDX [67].
SDX Taxonomy
We initiated our investigation by conducting an extensive review of SDX architec-
tures [20]. Taking into account the exchange of computing, storage, and networking
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resources the spectrum of definitions for an SDX ranges from networking exchanges
to cloud-service exchanges. We defined a taxonomy for SDX [21, 20], based on the
resources exchanged as shown in Figure 2. It is important to note that most of the
work in inter-cloud precedes the definition of the term SDX. An observation of our
study is that infrastructures that do not classify themselves as SDX can be organized
under our taxonomy.
Figure 2: SDX Taxonomy
SDX Use Cases
Our SDX taxonomy classifies SDX architecture infrastructures, which influences the
type of application or use case for an SDX. For instance, on an Internet exchange point
(IXP), we would like to define richer policies than those allowed by BGP. To augment
the capabilities of BGP policies in an IXP, Gupta et al. [49] proposed four SDX
applications: application-specific peering, inbound traffic engineering, wide-area load
balancing, and redirection through middle boxes. In the context of federated testbeds,
the FELIX project[15] defines six applications classified into two main groups: the
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data domain and the infrastructure domain. Under the data domain, the authors de-
fined three applications: data-on-demand, data preprocessing, and high-quality media
transmission over long-distance networks. The applications for the infrastructure do-
main are data mobility for inter-cloud use, follow-the-sun (or -moon) principles, and
disaster recovery by IaaS migration. Table 1 summarizes SDX applications that we
found in the literature.
Table 1: SDX Uses Cases




Two neighboring AS exchange
traffic only for certain applica-
tions. SDX could instead install
custom rules for groups of flows
corresponding to specific parts of
flow space.
ISP could configure packet
classifiers, Virtual Routing




By installing forwarding rules in
SDN-enabled switches at an ex-
change point, an AS can directly
control inbound traffic according
to source IP addresses or port
numbers.
Destination based routing.
Need to use AS prepend-





A participant could announce
anycast prefixes and the SDX
controller would rewrite the des-
tination IP address to match the
chosen hosting location based on
any fields in the packet header.
DNS global load balancing,
IPv6 anycast
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An SDN-enabled exchange point
can redirect targeted subsets of
traffic through one or more mid-
dleboxes.
Manipulate the routing pro-
tocols to “steer” traffic




An SDX controller could au-
tomatically establish links be-
tween different end points (e.g.
data storage and applications or
users), guaranteeing the reliabil-
ity of the end-to-end communica-
tion (e.g. minimum delay and jit-
ter).
Content Centric Networks







In these situations, a dedicated
platform would be placed near
the receiver station and perform
a suitable preprocessing of the
data, reducing the size of the data
to be transferred.







A higher quality of the media
playback, imposes higher band-
width and lower delay constraints
on the network. This will re-
quire inter-domain QoS policies
to achieve satisfactory QoE.
Compression and buffering
techniques at the client and
server ends
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Use Case Description Current Solution
DDoS
Mitigation[34]
Add DDoS detection and mitiga-









Data mobility service by SDN
technologies. A SDX controller
would be able to transfer user
data (such as credentials, appli-
cations and services) to a cloud






An SDX controller could shift the
load of one federated cloud to an-
other one depending on the avail-







An SDX controller could coordi-
nate the configuration of the hy-
pervisor resources with the net-
work bandwidth constraints to al-
low a fast and efficient migration
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routing to the same destination
based on different source IP ad-
dresses.





The purpose of IDPC is to achieve
end-to-end QoS routing. After
WE-Bridge modules in all the do-
mains exchange local virtual net-
work views including the band-
width information, each domain




We conducted a comparison of the SDX architectures according to metrics such as
scalability, resiliency, and peering boundaries (see Table 2).
Scalability - In the literature only SDX [49], Cardigan [96] and SDN-IP [68]
present a performance evaluation of their solutions while FELIX [15], WEBridge [67],
and SP-SDN[61]) do not provide any quantitative evaluation of their work. The main
scalability metric for SDX, Cardigan, and SDN-IP is the number of RIB entries or
flow rules, since they are examples of Layer-3 SDXs. Table 3 shows the performance
evaluation results presented in each paper. For SDX, we considered the maximum
values of 1,000 prefix groups with 300 participants in the IXP [49]. For SDN-IP, we
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considered the most recent value shown in ONOS SDN-IP Wiki1 as opposed to the
value presented in the paper [68].
Table 3: Layer-3 SDX Scalability comparison
Name Max. Flow Rules Compilation or Convergence Time
SDX 30000 700 sec.
Cardigan 1135 1 sec.
SDN-IP 15000 RIB entries 100 RIB updates/sec
Resilience - Resilience is the ability to maintain acceptable levels of service
in the face of faults in the network infrastructure. In this regard, since the SDX
controller becomes a single point of failure in the centralized approach, the peer-
to-peer SDX architecture is inherently more resilient. However, resilience measures
can be built into the centralized SDX architecture by the addition of distributed-
computing techniques. For instance, SDN-IP is an application that runs on top of
ONOS[8], an SDN-distributed network operating system.
Peering Technologies - To enable inter-domain networking, the boundaries be-
tween domains need to be set. BGP is used for Layer-3 routing while VLAN mapping
and Q-in-Q tunneling are preferred in Layer-2 deployments. More recent architec-
tures such as peer-to-peer SDN SDX require modifications to the LLDP protocol that
delineate the boundaries between two SDN domains [67] in an automated fashion.
Deployment Considerations - The deployment of an SDX requires several
considerations with regard to downtime, network topology changes, and disruption of
services. Although Cardigan was deployed in a small IXP in New Zealand, the study
does not discuss deployment issues or experiences [96]. By contrast, the remainder
of the proposed solutions have been tested in emulation environments (i.e., Mininet)
or in research and education networks. To deploy a large-scale Layer-3 SDX in an
IXP, network operators might take advantage of hybrid SDN approaches in which
SDN and conventional switches coexist in the same infrastructure. For instance, it is
1https://wiki.onosproject.org/display/ONOS/SDN-IP+Architecture
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preferable that an IXP maintain its high-speed core fabric while adding SDX switches
in the edge, which allow richer BGP policies.
Regarding centralized SDN SDX architectures, a sliced approach will increase the
cost of deployment. For instance, if a certain SDN domain does not participate in
an exchange using a slice manager, the deployment of the slice manager should be
carefully planned so that it does not interrupt service in a production network. Since
the resources allocated to the SDX are isolated and restricted, the sliced approach
provides the most security. In the case of the subcontroller architecture, one should
consider the communication protocol between controllers in the hierarchy (i.e., the
customer controller, the ISP controller, and the ISP sub-controller) and have a rule
conflict resolution mechanism for security.
Finally, control messaging should be deployed over secure protocols. In the case
of a centralized SDX controller over slices, the use of TLS should be mandatory, and
mutual authentication between the controller and slices is recommended. Likewise,
peer-to-peer approaches should include security mechanisms in their protocols such
as encryption of the payload and authentication of peer SDX controllers.
Security Considerations for SDXs
The NSF report on the workshop on software-defined infrastructure (SDI) and software-
defined exchanges [88] identified network slicing as a promising way of securing SDI
and SDX. A network slice is a logical instantiation of a physical network that provides
the isolation of user traffic. The authors emphasize that to achieve secure slicing, SDX
slices should incorporate admission control, secure slice provisioning, unforgeable slice
identifiers across domains, and verification and auditing mechanisms. Although net-
work slicing provides security guarantees for an SDX, the SDN paradigm introduces a
new attack vector on a network infrastructure. For instance, if we assume a compro-
mised SDN controller that allows an attacker to gain control over the whole network
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or compromised switches that install malicious flow rules on the data plane [65], such
problems could be extrapolated to an SDX as a malicious SDX controller or a partic-
ipant domain. In the following paragraphs, we present studies that have tackled the
problem of malicious SDN controllers and switches on a single domain.
One architecture that has addressed the problem of compromised switches is Flow-
Mon. This architecture detects compromised switches through real-time analysis of
network traffic statistics collected by OpenFlow in an SDN controller. Their main
objective is to detect packet droppers (i.e., switches that purposely drop packets)
and packet swappers (i.e., switches that forward packets to port that they were not
intended for). To achieve their goal, the authors extended an SDN controller with
two extra functional blocks: a malicious switch detection and prevention (MSDP)
block and a policy block. While the MSDP continually and transparently analyzes
the communication between the controller and switches, the policy block contains a
set of rules enforced whenever a malicious switch is detected. The authors then pro-
posed algorithms for detecting packet droppers by using information collected from
port statistics from switches, and packet swappers by investigating the reports of
unknown flows and comparing their expected output interfaces to their actually ob-
served ones. Their results indicated that both algorithms had the ability to detect
malicious switches in a mixed environment.
In another study that mitigate problems with malicious controllers, Schiff and
Schmid [89] analyzed distributed control planes that are resilient to malicious con-
trollers, represented by a malicious network administrator, a compromised controller
software, or unintentional misconfigurations. The authors argued that a control plane
that is resilient to malicious controllers requires a basic notion of memory and aware-
ness of history. Their solution introduced a model in which a majority of benign
controllers is responsible for accurately updating data plane switches despite the
presence of malicious controllers by using a light-weight inband mechanism analogous
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to consensus protocols. Their model assumes that data plane switches are trusted
and each switch maintains a summary of the controller state and history. After veri-
fying that a majority of controllers agree on the change, the switches implement the
requested update.
Betge-Brezetz et al. [10] proposed a solution for alleviating a possible lack of
trust between an SDN controller and its applications. Their proposal was similar, in
essence, to that in [89] because it relied on several redundant controllers that may
also be running separate executing environments. However, instead of a consensus
protocol, the authors introduced an intermediary layer, a trusted-oriented controller
proxy (ToCP), between the control plane and the data plane. ToPC was responsible
for collecting and analyzing configuration requests from all redundant controllers and
evaluating if they were consistent and trustworthy before determining whether to
deploy them in the data plane or not. Their solution, implemented in Java, used
the OpenVirtex [1] network hypervisor. Their results showed that ToPC introduced
performance costs because of the degradation of service and the addition of computing
resources.
1.5 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces our reference archi-
tecture for orchestrating intercontinental multi-domain, multi-path advance reserva-
tions in science networks leveraging SDN and SDX, and Chapter 3 shows the design,
implementation, and evaluation of a system for multi-domain, multi-path interconti-
nental advance reservations based on our architecture. Chapter 4 present the design
of a proposed interface that allows domain-expert scientists to request novel network
services for supporting big data science research. Chapter 5 presents FAS, a feder-
ated auditing system for SDXs that allows network operators to verify whether their
configurations have been correctly deployed on an SDX without revealing internal
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topology detail of participant SDXs. In chapter 5 we also present an architecture for
advance reservation access control using SDN and tokens. Finally, Chapter 6 presents
the conclusions of this thesis, and defines future research necessary to further evaluate





To support multi-path, multi-domain advance reservations for intercontinental ded-
icated circuits, we require an architecture that takes advantage of the agile pro-
grammability of SDN and the enriched connectivity provided by SDX to compose
functional multi-path, multi-domain advance reservations while improving the suc-
cess rate of user’s requests and the performance of science data transfers. Our initial
investigation reveals that no existing architecture is capable of providing multi-path,
multi-domain advance reservations. Hence, we propose a new architecture [24], which
is composed of the following components (see Figure 3):
1. Site controllers residing at sites research facilities that generate or process data.
2. WAN and SDX controllers that interconnect participating sites.
3. Orchestrators that consume services from site, WAN, and SDX controllers, while
exposing end-to-end services to end users.
4. Users (e.g., domain-expert scientists) or applications (e.g., data workflow man-
agement systems) that consume end-to-end services composed by an orchestra-
tor.
2.1 Site, WAN, and SDX Controllers
The site, WAN, and SDX components of our architecture follow the same SDN ab-
straction proposed by the ONF (i.e., infrastructure layer, control layer, and applica-
tion layer). In our architecture, the application layer of SDN represents the science
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Figure 3: Reference architecture for end-to-end service orchestration in multi-domain
science networks. Several independent administrative domains are connected by
inter-domain links, and expose science network services to a centralized orchestrator
through the domain to orchestrator (D-O) interface. The orchestrator then composes
end-to-end science network services and exposes them to domain-expert scientists and
data transfer applications through the user to orchestrator (U-O) interface.
network services exposed by each type of controller (i.e., site, WAN, and SDX con-
troller). In this context, a site, WAN, or SDX controller may be any type of existing
SDN controller, advanced reservation system, or SDX controller. The main require-
ment is that the northbound interface of these controllers should abstract the details
of the network infrastructure and expose relevant science network services. More de-
tails about this type of interface is provided in Section 2.3.1. The infrastructure layer
is composed of the data plane switches of each participant domain.
2.2 Orchestrator
The orchestrator is in charge of consuming services exposed by participant domains
(e.g., Site, WAN, and SDX controllers), and composing end-to-end scientific services.
For instance, in order to connect site A to site B in Figure 3, the orchestrator needs to
know if all domains in between can provide this connectivity. To successfully compose
end-to-end services, an orchestrator requires resource management, scheduling, and
path computation functionalities. Our orchestrator maintains a minimal set of tables
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or “databases”: a table of participant domains and the services they provide, and a
global topology view. Two approaches exist for managing and scheduling resources.
The orchestrator may maintain a centralized resource manager and scheduler, or
the orchestrator may allow each domain to manage their resources, and query for
their network status whenever is needed. Currently, some [40] advocate for a loosely
coupled infrastructure, leaning which matches the second approach.
An example of end-to-end service composition is the following: a user or appli-
cation wants to connect a telescope in site A to a supercomputer in site B with a
maximum latency of 100 ms. After verifying the domains involved in this end-to-end
service, the orchestrator contacts each domain, querying if a path with the requested
maximum delay is possible. Each queried domain does not have global knowledge
about the end-to-end path, but they can commit to latency of their portion of the
end-to-end path. The orchestrator then has to evaluate if a path that meets the
end-to-end latency requirement can be formed. Otherwise, the orchestrator will try
to find an alternative path, or will try to negotiate a maximum delay higher than 100
ms. In the presence of multiple paths and SDXs interconnecting them, the chances
of composing a successful end-to-end service rises.
2.3 Interfaces and Services
Users in our system are domain-expert scientists whom in most of the cases do not
have expertise in network operations, but still need to request reservations to expedite
their data transfers. Additionally, scientists use data workflow management systems
(e.g., Globus [45]) to automate the process of moving and sharing data across research
facilities. In our reference architecture, both scientists and applications request end-
to-end science network services to the orchestrator by using interfaces that abstract
network infrastructure details in our reference architecture. The following subsections
provide more details about the interfaces that allow communication between site,
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WAN, or SDX controllers and an orchestrator, and between users or applications and
orchestrators.
2.3.1 Domain to Orchestrator (D-O) Interface
The domain to orchestrator interface, depicted as D-O interface in Figure 3 allows
a science network orchestrator to consume services from a site, WAN, or SDX con-
troller. To understand the services that should be exposed by a site controller, we
studied the Energy Science Network (ESNet) requirement review reports from 2013 to
2015 [26], and synthesized the most common scientific data transfers as follows: bulk
data transfer, real-time data transfer, and management network traffic. Bulk data
transfer is used to move large data sets between research facilities. GridFTP [2], an
enhanced version of FTP for scientific applications, is one of the most used protocols
for performing this kind of data transfer. Real-time data transfers are used for data
streaming applications. For instance, a sensor network installed in an agricultural
field transfers real-time sensor data to a remote server, or a scientist may access a
remote visualization of a simulation running on a supercomputer. Management traf-
fic allows the monitoring of the network by conducting active network performance
tests, or managing scientific workflows, such as scheduling a backup or changing the
orientation of a remote telescope.
2.3.2 User/Application to Orchestrator (U-O) Interface
The user/application to orchestrator interface, depicted as U-O interface in Figure 3
allows a scientist or a scientific application to request services from a science network
orchestrator. To overcome rigid interfaces that only allow users to request a certain
amount of bandwidth during a limited amount of time, we propose to describe a
request based on time and bandwidth constraints. For instance, continuing with the
example presented in Section 2.2, the user requires that her connection has strict
time constraints (i.e., the transfer starts at 6:00AM local time, after the telescope has
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taken images of the night sky), and the connection requires maximum bandwidth to
finish the job as soon as possible. Details of bandwidth and delay should be left for
network operators. A domain-expert scientist, for example a physicist, only wants to
transfer X amount of gigabytes before certain deadline. The U-O interface includes
flexible parameters that allow the orchestrator to negotiate an optimal solution to
a user request, given the user constraints and the network state. Although, the U-
O interface is an important component of the overall architecture, we will focus on
the D-O interface and the components pertaining the network infrastructure for this
study.
2.4 Authentication and Authorization
Authentication and authorization are important topics in this architecture for multi-
domain science networks. Authentication is required for the orchestrator to authen-
ticate participant entities and users or applications coming from several independent
administrative domains. Then, authorization is required before the orchestrator is-
sues any provisioning request to participant domains. Digital certificates may be used
for mutual authentication between the orchestrator and participant entities, and a
federated identity management system (e.g., Shibboleth [94]) may be used for the
orchestrator to authenticate users and applications. Under this model, users are not
required to have an account at each location, but they are authenticated using their
institutional credentials. We propose to enforce authorization by installing policies on
each entity (i.e., Site, WAN, and SDX controllers) that define what are users allowed
to do, depending on their roles or affiliation (e.g., institution, project, or individual).
2.5 Consensus and Negotiation Protocol
Consensus among participant domains is vital for ensuring consistency of end-to-end
services across multiple domains. For example, if one of the domains involved in
an end-to-end service is not able to provide the requested service, the orchestrator
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should be able to resolve this issue. Another example is that two users request the
same resources at the same time, leading to a potential race condition. We propose
to incorporate a two-phase commit protocol in the D-O interface to ensure consensus
among participant domains and the orchestrator.
A negotiation protocol is a vital component of our architecture that allows the
orchestrator to compose multi-domain, multi-path advance reservations. In tradi-
tional settings, an orchestrator will only be allowed to make reservations after a path
computation system determines the domains on a single path. In our approach, a
negotiation protocol will allow the orchestrator to explore multiple paths, and dis-
tribute the bandwidth reservation among several advance reservation systems. Then,
negotiate with several SDXs to interconnect these advance reservations and compose







3.1.1 Bandwidth Request Splitting in Advance Reservation Systems
Traditionally, advance reservations requests are defined by source and destination
endpoints, required bandwidth, start time, and end time. An advance reservation
system performs path computation and scheduling operations to verify if resources
are available to fulfill a request. Current implementations try to find an exact match
for constraints provided in the request, and they fail if a suitable advance reservation is
not found. Researchers have proposed scheduling algorithms for flexible (or malleable)
advance reservation that increase the success rate of a reservation request on single
domain scenarios [6, 101, 105]. However, for intercontinental advance reservations, in
which the circuit spans multiple domains and follows a single path, flexible/malleable
techniques lose their benefits because participant domains have to agree on the rigid
constraints of the original request to compose the end-to-end service.
Let us consider a multi-domain, single-path advance reservation, with N partic-
ipant domains and a success probability p for each individual domain. Then, the
success probability of the entire reservation request (i.e., all domains succeed) is pN .
For instance, according to Xiao et al. [105] a conventional reservation system has a
66% success rate. If we consider an international advance reservation that spans two
independent administrative domains, the success rate decreases to 43.56%.
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Now, let us consider a multi-domain advance reservation that allows path diver-
sity, and the requested bandwidth can be split over multiple paths. For simplicity,
let us consider two research facilities connected across two possible advance reserva-
tion systems. We are allowed to request advance reservations to both systems, and
we obtain a successful multi-domain, multi-path advance reservation if the sum of
multiple path bandwidth requests is greater than or equal to the original required
bandwidth. For N possible bandwidth offers from each domain, we obtain N2 overall














As N tends to infinity, the probability of success of such a system is approximately
50%. Fortunately, these types of scenarios are possible in the real world. The average
degree of both ESNet’s and Internet2’s routed network topologies is approximately
three (i.e., on average we could find three mutually exclusive paths between a source
and a destination within any of these domains). Furthermore, we also find this path
diversity on intercontinental links originated from the United States, as shown in
Figure 4. The topology maps of ESNet [35] and Internet2 [42] report at least three
links to Asia Pacific, three links to Latin America, and four links to Europe. However,
this improvement is not possible without architectural changes to the system that
supports end-to-end science network services. What architectural approaches will
enable multi-path, multi-domain advance reservations for intercontinental dedicated
circuits, while enhancing the performance of science data transfers? We posit that by
inserting an SDX in the junction point between participant domains enabling advance
reservations to multiple domains in the path between two research facilities, we can
compose functional multi-path, multi-domain advance reservations that enhance the
performance of science data transfers.
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Figure 4: Intercontinental R&E links originated from the United States.
3.1.2 Software-defined Networking (SDN)
By taking advantage of the agile programmability of SDN, Ibarra et al. [56] have im-
proved the provisioning time of international advance reservations in R&E networks
from several days to a few minutes. Furthermore, in our work [23] we proposed the use
of SDN and tokens to protect access to advance reservations at the research facility
end, while keeping the same improvements achieved in [56]. Although SDN effectively
reduces provisioning times of advance reservations, international or intercontinen-
tal advance reservations will require WAN-optimized protocols for the coordination
and composition of science network services. What architectural approaches will al-
low multiple independent administrative domains to cooperate in the composition of
multi-path, multi-domain advance reservations while maintaining the improvements
attained by SDN in terms of provisioning times? We postulate that an orchestration
layer on top of domain, SDN controllers or advance reservation systems, combined
with a WAN-optimized negotiation protocol will maintain the composition and provi-
sioning of multi-path, multi-domain advance reservations in the order of seconds.
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3.1.3 Software-defined Exchange (SDX)
SDXs are another architectural innovation that will enable multi-path, multi-domain
advance reservations. Moreover, SDXs will also enable novel science network services
such as multi-path bandwidth splitting across independent WAN providers, scheduled
path migrations that are transparent to data transfer applications, and multipoint-
to-multipoint advance reservations. As SDX is a nascent technology, we need to know
the advantages and disadvantages of using SDX as an interconnection point for multi-
path, multi-domain advance reservations. For instance, it is well known that when
using hashing for load balancing, all traffic corresponding to the same hash will be sent
to the same interface. Nevertheless, we can take advantage of data transfer protocols
(e.g., BBCP [82] and GridFTP [2]) that create multiple parallel TCP streams [54],
and distribute these streams over a multi-path, multi-domain advance reservation.
Furthermore, data transfer protocols have been designed for resilience. Another ex-
ample is the case when networking resources are not available on a continuous time
window in all domains. We propose to use SDXs to transparently migrate advance
reservations from one path to another in the middle of an advance reservation. What
are the architectural approaches at the SDX level that will enable the aforementioned
novel science network services while enhancing the performance of end-to-end data
transfers? We hypothesize that by designing SDX services that take advantage of the
network traffic characteristics of data transfer protocols, we will improve the perfor-
mance of science data transfers, while enabling novel services not offered before by
science and R&E networks.
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3.2 Design
In this section we present the design challenges for a system that provides multi-
domain, multi-path advance reservation for intercontinental circuits in science net-
works [24]. We focus on the orchestrator and its interfaces that are used to com-
municate with end users and participant domains, the negotiation protocol, and the
SDX services required to compose this kind of circuits. Additional components of
the orchestrator such as path computation, scheduling, and resource management
are outside the scope of this work, but algorithmic approaches to these standard
components are readily available in the literature.
So far we have presented the orchestrator as an entity that oversees the compo-
sition of intercontinental advance reservations. However, many questions emerge in
terms of real-world deployment and management: is the orchestrator centralized or
distributed? Who runs and manages the orchestrator? We propose that a single
entity deploys several instances of the orchestrator for load balancing and resilience.
The orchestrator then, is physically distributed and logically centralized. The or-
chestrator may be run by a consortium of network providers. For more flexibility,
we propose that each scientific community runs its own orchestrator that exposes
services to orchestrators in higher levels, creating a hierarchy of end-to-end service
orchestrators.
3.2.1 General Workflow
This section describes the general workflow for requesting and composing multi-path,
multi-domain intercontinental advance reservations. We assume that multiple paths
exist between two research facilities, and these paths traverse multiple administra-
tive domains that provide connectivity and guaranteed bandwidth by using advanced
reservation systems. We also assume that SDXs serve as interconnection points for
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these administrative domains, enabling richer connectivity. An orchestrator (see Sec-
tion 2.2) then is in charge of receiving user requests, requesting science network
resources from the participant domains, and composing end-to-end services. We as-
sume that advance reservation systems provide network service offers the same way
airlines allow us to consult flight availability. For example, the newest code base
for OSCARS provides a “what if?” function that will allow scientists to plan their
network reservations on a Web interface [37].
Figure 5: General workflow for requesting multi-domain, multipath advance reserva-
tions.
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Figure 5 depicts the general worflow for requesting multi-domain, multipath ad-
vance reservations. The workflow starts with a user requesting an international or
intercontinental advance reservation to the orchestrator, which performs path com-
putation to determine the domains and SDXs on the path. From the orchestrator’s
point of view, participant domains are seen as links, while SDXs are seen as inter-
connection points. Then, the orchestrator decomposes the end-to-end request into
individual requests for each domain and SDX on the path, and the orchestrator re-
quests reservation offers to participant domains. Finally, the orchestrator uses these
offers to compose an end-to-end service, commit offers and contact SDXs to make
interconnections if an end-to-end service is possible, and aborts unused offers. Oth-
erwise the orchestrator aborts all offers.
3.2.2 Negotiation Protocol
In this section we take a deeper look into the negotiation protocol that allows the
orchestrator to compose multi-path, multi-domain advance reservations. By allowing
multiple paths, and using SDXs as interconnection points, we increase the chances of
obtaining a successful reservation as demonstrated in Section 3.1.1. The negotiation
protocol is divided in two phases: phase 1 requests offers from participant domains
and composes an end-to-end service, and phase 2 commits the successful offers, aborts
unused offers, and request interconnection at SDXs. It is important to note that not
all participants are willing to provide reservation offers, either because they have
legacy systems, or because they have privacy concerns. We identify those domains
that provide reservation offers as visible domains, and those that do not provide offers
as blind domains. Visible domains are considered as the initial option to compose
the end-to-end service. Blind domains are only considered if visible domains do not
have enough resources. The rationale behind this strategy is that by considering blind
domains for remaining resources, we increase the chances of success because it is easier
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to allocate smaller amounts of bandwidth. Our negotiation protocol is composed
of seven types of messages: Reservation, ReqOffers, SendOffers, ReservationPrep,
Commit, Abort, and ReservationResp, that we describe in Table 4.
Table 4: Negotiation Protocol Messages
Message Type Description
Reservation Message from the user to the orchestrator request-
ing an intercontinental advance reservation
ReqOffers Message from the orchestrator to visible domains
requesting advance reservation offers
SendOffers Message from visible domains to the orchestrator
replaying with a list of advance reservation offers
ReservationPrep Message from the orchestrator to all participant
domains and SDXs requesting the preparation of
an advance reservation
Commit Message from the orchestrator to all participant
domains and SDXs committing an advance reser-
vation already prepared
Abort Message from the orchestrator to all participant
domains and SDXs aborting an advance reserva-
tion already prepared
ReservationResp Message from all participant domains and SDXs to
the orchestrator replaying if a preparation, com-
mit, or abort request was a success or a failure.
This message is also used by the orchestrator to
report the results of the request to the user
Figure 6 shows the detailed negotiation protocol considering N participant do-
mains, with M visible domains and N −M blind domains. We consider three sce-
narios:
1. No visibility (M = 0): All participant domains are blind domains (i.e., tra-
ditional advance reservation systems).
2. Full visibility (M = N): All participant domains are visible domains (i.e.,
provide bandwidth offers).
3. Partial visibility (M 6= N): blind domains and visible domains participate
in the orchestration process.
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Figure 6: Negotiation protocol for multi-path, multi-domain advance reservation
with M visible domains and N −M blind domains.
The negotiation starts with a user requesting a Reservation. This reservation is
decomposed by the orchestrator into individual reservation requests. How the or-
chestrator divides the original bandwidth request depends on the number of visible
and blind domains participating in the process. The orchestrator sends ReqOffers
messages to the M visible domains. These domains respond with SendOffers mes-
sages to the orchestrator, which uses these offers to compose an end-to-end service.
Each SendOffers message contains a token ID [23] to identify the reservation request,
because a domain controller may handle several requests from other individual users
or orchestrators at a time. If the orchestrator is able to compose an end-to-end
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service, the orchestrator transitions to phase 2 of the negotiation protocol by initiat-
ing a two-phase commit process with the participant domains and the SDXs (using
ReservationPrep, Commit, Abort, and ReservationResp messages). Otherwise, the
orchestrator requests the remaining resources to the blind domains and tries to com-
pose a new end-to-end service. If the service composition succeeds, the orchestrator
transitions to phase 2, otherwise the reservation request fails.
3.2.3 SDX Rules
As mentioned in section 3.2.1, SDXs are considered interconnection points in our
design. For simplicity, we consider that SDXs have sufficient bandwidth to allocate
user requests, so advance reservations are not needed inside the SDX itself. Addition-
ally, we assume that SDXs in a given domain are in a single location (i.e., SDXs are
not geographically distributed systems inside a single domain). We also assume that
advance reservation systems provision layer 2 dedicated circuits or L2 tunnels over
VLANs at each interconnection point. As a result, an SDX allows rules that bridge a
VLAN in an inbound port to another VLAN in an outbound port, split traffic among
several outbound ports, and create the corresponding mirror policies for bidirectional
traffic.
Figure 7 illustrate the bandwidth splitting service block diagram. Our architec-
ture takes advantage of the multi-streaming capability of existing science network
data transfer protocols (e.g., BBCP and GridFTP). For instance, the Globus imple-
mentation of GridFTP [3] uses both TCP striping [54] and parallel TCP to achieve
multi-streaming. We propose that an SDN switch and an SDN controller create flow
rules that assign a new VLAN ID to every new TCP flow. Ideally, these switches and
SDN controllers will be provisioned on demand for each new multi-domain, multi-
path advance reservation, and may reside at the edge of the SDX or at the end sites.


























Figure 7: Block diagram of bandwidth splitting service components for SDX rule
provisioning.
path at the SDX.
The SDN switches in Figure 7 have two ports: a WAN port that receives all
the VLAN IDs representing the L2 tunnels, and a LAN port that connects the end
site. The SDN controllers receive a pool of VLANs from the orchestrator, and tags
each new packet from a specific flow that appears on the LAN port with a new
VLAN ID from the pool before sending the packet to the WAN port. For every new
packet that arrives on the WAN port, the SDN controller removes the VLAN tag and
forwards the packet to the LAN port. The SDN controller selects VLAN IDs from
the pool in a round robin fashion. To ensure that all the traffic belonging to a single
flow traverses the same circuit, a synchronization or coordination between the SDN
controllers assigning the VLANs might exist. Otherwise, we might have the forward
traffic of a TCP flow traversing one tunnel, and all the ACKs returning over another
tunnel. The use of multiple parallel and disjoint TCP flows is not new, but how to
accomplish this in SDX-enabled science data networks is novel.
We consider three approaches for provisioning bandwidth splitting rules in an
SDX: (1) synchronized, (2) unsynchronized, and (3) coordinated VLAN provision-
ing. The synchronized approach relies on both SDXs iterating over the VLAN pool
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synchronously, effectively mapping each TCP stream to an end-to-end path. The un-
synchronized approach does not care about mapping TCP streams to an end-to-end
path, as long as all path converge to the same SDX and the VLAN ID is stripped or
changed to a single VLAN ID before a packet is sent to the end site. The coordinated
approach guarantees that each TCP stream is mapped to an end-to-end path by
proactively installing a return traffic rule on the receiver side, for each new forward-
ing rule that appears on the sender side. A fourth approach is to proactively install
all possible combinations of TCP source and destination ports mapped to the pool
of VLANs. This approach is too expensive in terms flow table entries, and requires
prior knowledge of the TCP port ranges used in both data transfer nodes. Dynamic
configuration of data transfer nodes is outside of the scope of this work. For that
reason, we do not consider the proactive approach in this study.
3.2.4 Interconnecting the Last Mile
An important component of our design is the last mile interconnection between the
WAN border router and the scientific instrument or supercomputer at the research
facility. Ideally, an SDN controller at the research facility will provision this last
mile interconnection, or a science DMZ [28], a dedicated network for scientific data
transfers, may be used to protect the science network traffic. In the absence of any
of those mechanisms, traditional QoS techniques may be used to provide prioritized
access to the network for scientific data transfers.
3.3 Implementation
In this section we present the implementation of an orchestrator for multi-path, multi-




We implemented the orchestrator in Python using an agent-based approach. In this
approach, each participant domain hosts an agent that receives offer requests from
an orchestrator, process those requests internally, and send offers back to the or-
chestrator. We selected an agent-based approach as opposed to simply consuming
the APIs provided by each participant domain because that allows us to control the
WAN communication channel between orchestrator and participant domains, while
allowing us to customize interfaces for each domain controller. The orchestrator
communicates with the agents using the general remote procedure call (gRPC) pro-
tocol [48], a high-performance RPC framework optimized for distributed computing
and mobile environments. gRPC uses HTTP/2, a binary protocol that multiplexes
multiple streams over a single TCP connection, for establishing communication chan-
nels between servers and stubs. On the other hand, HTTP/1.1 uses multiple TCP
connections to issue parallel requests. Another advantage of gRPC is that it uses
protocol buffers [47] for defining services and message types, and serializing data.
3.3.2 Negotiation Protocol Implementation
Considering the three scenarios described in section 3.2.2 (i.e., no visibility, full visi-
bility, and partial visibility), we define three variants of the negotiation protocol for
bandwidth splitting:
1. Equally Splitting: This strategy could be applied to any scenario. However,
it is more suitable for the no visibility scenario, because it does not require the
ability to request offers. In this approach the orchestrator divides the original
bandwidth request in equal parts among the participant domains (see Algorithm
1).
2. Partial Offers: This approach is mainly applicable to the partial visibility
scenario. Here the orchestrator contacts the visible domains for bandwidth
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offers. If the orchestrator is able to compose an end-to-end service with these
offers only, the orchestrator proceeds with Phase 2 of our negotiation protocol
(i.e., provisioning). Otherwise, the orchestrator tries to request the remaining
bandwidth from blind domains (see Algorithm 2).
3. Full Offers: This approach is only applicable to the full visibility scenario. In
this approach the orchestrator contacts all participant domains for bandwidth
offers. If the orchestrator is able to compose an end-to-end service with these
offers, the orchestrator proceeds with Phase 2, otherwise the reservation request
fails (see Algorithm 3).
Algorithm 1 Equally Splitting
BD ← Set of blind domain




N ← Total number of participant domains
M ← Number of visible domains
EqSplitReq ← BwReq/N
for domain ∈ D do







Our SDX implementation is based on AtlanticWave/SDX [33], an SDX controller
written in Python that uses the Ryu SDN Framework [84] as an OpenFlow [75]
speaker, and has a REST API and Web application for management. Currently, At-
lanticWave/SDX supports advance reservation of L2 tunnels using the Web interface
or the REST API. We added the bandwidth query functionality through a REST
API in AtlanticWave/SDX to support our negotiation protocol. We verified that OS-
CARS, supports a similar functionality through their Web interface, but it does not
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Algorithm 2 Partial Offers
BD ← Set of blind domain




N ← Total number of participant domains
M ← Number of visible domains












for domain ∈ BD do







Algorithm 3 Full Offers
BD ← Set of blind domain




N ← Total number of participant domains
M ← Number of visible domains











have a REST API for bandwidth queries.
The AtlanticWave/SDX controller provisions L2 tunnels using VLAN IDs, in the
same way OSCARS and AL2S provision their circuits. We take advantage of this
property to create our bandwidth splitting service using an Open vSwitch (OVS) [85]
switch in OpenFlow mode and a Ryu SDN controller to aggregate two or more L2
tunnels into a single network service as described in section 3.2.3.
We implemented the three rule provisioning strategies (i.e., synchronized, unsyn-
chronized, and coordinated) as Ryu apps. All approaches iterate over a pool of VLANs
assigned to each L2 tunnel in a round robin fashion. The synchronized approach re-
lies on traffic isolation to maintain synchronization between both iterators. In other
words, a pair of OVS-Ryu on each end controls all the traffic of a single multi-domain,
multi-path advance reservation. Both controllers start at the beginning of the list and
advance synchronously with every new flow. For the unsynchronized approach, we
intentionally forced one of the SDN controller to start iterating its VLAN pool list
from a greater index. For the coordinated approach, we used a single Ryu controller
on the Orchestrator controlling both OVS switches at the edge of the SDXs. We chose
this approach for simplicity, but the same goal could be achieved with two separate
controllers controlling each other through a REST API or another communication
channel.
3.4 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the success rate of the three variations of our negotiation
protocol, and the performance of several provisioning strategies for a multi-path,
multi-domain advance reservation service.
3.4.1 Orchestrator Microbenchmark
Figure 8 compares the system latency of our orchestrator for requesting resources
from eight participant domains, while variating the RTT between the orchestrator and
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Figure 8: System latency microbenchmark for an orchestrator requesting resources
from eight participant domains using REST and gRPC, and variating the RTT be-
tween participants and the orchestrator.
participants. We compare REST and gRPC for the communication channel between
the orchestrator and participant domains. We used the GENI (Global Environment
for Network Innovations) platform [9] to conduct our experiment. Our results shows
that even in the worst case scenario (i.e., using REST when the RTT is 300 ms),
the system latency remains below two seconds. We show that gRPC provides better
WAN performance as the system latency remains under one second all the values of
RTT tested.
3.4.2 Multi-path, Multi-domain Advance Reservations
To evaluate our multi-path, multi-domain advance reservation we consider the topol-
ogy depicted in figure 9(a). This topology is composed of four end sites (ANL, CERN,
Gatech, and ORNL), connected to three regional networks (GEANT, Starlight, and
SoX) where an SDX might reside. These three regional networks are further connected
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to two R&E networks: ESNet and Internet2. To simulate our proposed concepts in
this real network, we created a registry of advance reservations for both ESNet and
Internet2. Each record on the registry represents a time window, and contains the
available bandwidth (randomly generated) for every possible point-to-point connec-
tion. For our simulation we generate a random request composed of a time window,
a required bandwidth, a source, and a destination. We send this request to both
domains individually, and evaluate whether the domains have enough available re-
sources. For our multi-path, multi-domain advance reservation service we evaluate
whether the sum of the available bandwidth in both domains satisfies the request.
We assume a maximum bandwidth of 1 Gbps on both R&E networks. For sim-
plicity, we represent the registry of advance reservations as a time series, and for
each point in the time series we assign an available bandwidth value from a uni-
form distribution. The limitation of this approach is that the uniform distribution
provides a lower bound for the success rate of a single domain advance reservation
system (e.g., OSCARS [77], AL2S [58], and DANCES [52]). As already discussed in
section 3.1.1, the reservation success rate can be improved with flexible reservation
techniques [6, 101, 105], but these benefits are lost once we try to deploy single-path,
multi-domain advance reservations. For this reason, we consider the parameters used
in this simulation a fair representation of the single-path, multi-domain advance reser-
vation.
Figure 9(b) shows that our multi-path, multi-domain approach has an 85% suc-
cess rate when two independent paths are available, compared to approximately 50%
success rate for the state-of-the-art (single path) approach. This 50% success rate
of the state-of-the-art is a result of assuming a uniform distribution for the advance
reservation registry. The multi-path, multi-domain approach evaluated in this simu-
lation considers a full visibility scenario (section 3.2.2) with full offers (section 3.3.2)
from our negotiation protocol.
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Figure 9: Simulation topology and results: (a) topology for multi-path, multi-domain
advance reservation evaluation simulation; and (b) success rate for multi-path, multi-
domain advance reservation evaluation compared to the state-of-the-art methods.
3.4.3 Negotiation Protocol Success Rate
To evaluate the success rate of the three variants of our negotiation protocol (i.e.,
equally splitting, partial offers, and full offers), we simulated a scenario in which an
orchestrator can request advance reservations from up to four participant domains
to compose a multi-path, multi-domain advance reservation. We chose four domains,
because this is a reasonable number of multiple intercontinental paths between two
sites as mentioned in section 3.1. For each participant domain, we generated a band-
width schedule of 1000 entries that provide the available bandwidth at a given point
in time. A user generates 100 random bandwidth requests within the time window
defined by the aforementioned 1000 entries. We ran the simulation 32 times and took
the averages for each scenario.
Figure 10 shows the results of our simulations. The horizontal line represents the
success rate for a single domain, which is 49.56% under our assumptions. Any of our
strategies outperform the baseline. In the worst case scenario (i.e., equally splitting





















Figure 10: Negotiation protocol success rate for three bandwidth splitting strategies
and up to four participant domains.
the best conditions (four visible domains), our orchestrator (with full offers) achieves
approximately 99% success rate, or 2X improvement.
3.4.4 SDX Experimental Setup
Figure 11 shows the topology of our experimental setup, and table 5 shows the spec-
ifications of the equipment we used to build the testbed. Our testbed is composed
of four virtual switch instances or bridges (bridge1, bridge2, bridge3, and bridge4)
hosted by a Corsa DP2100 OpenFlow dataplane. Each bridge is connected to an
instance of the AtlanticWave/SDX controller [33] (SDX1, SDX2, SDX3, and SDX4)
running on a Docker container inside a Dell PowerEdge R220 server. This server also
hosts our orchestration system: four instances of our orchestration agents (agent1,
agent2, agent3, and agent4), and one orchestrator. Each orchestrator agent runs on a
Docker container, and each one is paired with an SDX instance, while the orchestrator
runs on another Docker container and communicates with the agents using gRPC.
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We used two customized Supermicro server as the GridFTP endpoints. Each server
runs a docker container with either a GridFTP server or a GridFTP client (globus-
url-copy), an Open vSwitch (OVS) [85] virtual switch, and a Ryu SDN controller [84].
We added a delay of 45 ms on each server’s network interface for a 90 ms RTT to
emulate an intercontinental link. We tuned the TCP configuration of both endpoint
servers for 1 Gbps link speed, 90 ms RTT, and parallel streams as recommended by






















Figure 11: Experimental setup topology.
3.4.5 Throughput Baseline
Data Transfer Methods
We measured the throughput baseline of a data transfer over a single-path, multi-
domain advance reservation versus a data transfer over a multi-path, multi-domain ad-
vance reservation on our testbed using two data transfer methods: GridFTP memory-
to-memory (m2m), and GridFTP disk-to-disk (d2d) data transfers. We used iperf3,
51
Table 5: Experimental setup, equipment specifications
Equipment Specifications
Corsa DP2100 OpenFlow 1.5, multiple flow ta-
bles, multi-context virtualization,




Ubuntu Server 16.04, 16 GB
RAM, four Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU E3-1220 v3 @ 3.10GHz pro-




Ubuntu Server 16.04, 8 GB
RAM, four Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU X3430 @ 2.40GHz, two Gi-
gabit Ethernet interfaces
a well-known bandwidth measuring tool as a reference. Figure 12 shows the results
of performing the aforementioned data transfer over a 1 Gbps link with 90 ms RTT.
For iperf3 and GridFTP memory-to-memory, we sustained the data transfer for five
minutes, or the equivalent of transferring a 37.5 GB of data at line-rate over a 1 Gbps
link, while for GridFTP disk-to-disk we actually transferred a 20 GB file, which is a
reasonable size for a scientific dataset [26].
Figure 12(a) shows that iperf3 only reaches 514 Mbps of throughput for a single
L2 tunnel of 1 Gbps of bandwidth, while GridFTP only reaches 488.56 Mbps and
426.72 Mbps of throughput for memory-to-memory and disk-to-disk, respectively.
The reason for this low performance is that our endpoints are optimized for parallel
TCP streams. As we see for two and four parallel TCP streams, iperf3 utilized 93.6%
of the link (936 Mbps of throughput on average), and GridFTP memory-to-memory
used 88.92% (or 889.24 Mbps on average). However, GridFTP disk-to-disk is only
able to use approximately 67% (670.36 Mbps on average) of the link with parallel
streams.
Figure 12(b) shows the throughput baseline after splitting the bandwidth reser-










































Figure 12: Throughput measurements while performing data transfers using iperf3,
GridFTP memory-to-memory (m2m) and GridFTP disk-to-disk (d2d) over a 1 Gbps
link with 90 ms RTT: (a) shows the baseline for a single L2 tunnel of 1 Gbps, and
(b) shows the baseline for two L2 tunnels of 500 Mbps each.
iperf3 achieves 936 Mbps of throughput. However, it is only able to achieve 883 Mbps
with four parallel TCP streams per tunnel. GridFTP memory-to-memory shows more
consistent results, with 889.12 Mbps with one and two TCP streams, and 873.04 Mbps
with four streams. On the contrary, GridFTP disk-to-disk obtains a slight improve-
ment after using four TCP streams, achieving 733.44 Mbps of throughput, compared
to the 632 Mbps and 660.8 Mbps obtained with one and two parallel streams respec-
tively.
Number of TCP Streams
ESNet recommends the use of two or four parallel TCP streams for GridFTP data
transfers. We verified that this recommendation holds true for our bandwidth splitting
service by measuring throughput for a GridFTP memory-to-memory data transfer.
We considered five bandwidth splitting approaches described in table 6. The main
goal of the orchestrator in this scenario is to split a bandwidth reservation among two
L2 tunnels, obtaining an aggregate bandwidth of 1 Gbps. For instance, one strategy
is to split the bandwidth into two 500 Mbps tunnels. Another strategy is to split the
53
request into one tunnel of 100 Mbps and another tunnel of 900 Mbps.
Table 6: Splitting Strategies
Code Description
SS1 Tunnel 1: 100 Mbps, Tun-
nel 2: 900 Mbps
SS2 Tunnel 1: 200 Mbps, Tun-
nel 2: 800 Mbps
SS3 Tunnel 1: 300 Mbps, Tun-
nel 2: 700 Mbps
SS4 Tunnel 1: 400 Mbps, Tun-
nel 2: 600 Mbps
SS5 Tunnel 1: 500 Mbps, Tun-
nel 2: 500 Mbps
Figure 13 shows that for two and four parallel TCP streams, the throughput of
a data transfer stays very close to the no-splitting baseline of 889.24 Mbps. For one
stream per tunnel, the throughput increases as the bandwidth splitting strategy is
more balanced. This behavior can be explained from our observation in figure 12(a).
The TCP stream using a tunnel with a larger bandwidth reservation cannot fill the
pipe, because the endpoints are optimized for parallel streams. Meanwhile, the stream
using the smaller reservation is limited, resulting in a poor overall performance. In the
case of eight streams per tunnel, the throughput results are not optimal, as many TCP
streams are competing for the same resources. These results are important because
the orchestrator has to return meaningful recommendations to the end user for their
data transfers to run optimally. For instance, given that two streams per tunnel
provides optimal performance, our orchestrator should recommend the end user to
four parallel TCP on her application, because the reservation was split among two
tunnels. In the case of splitting the bandwidth among three tunnels, the orchestrator’s
recommendation should be six parallel streams.
54



















Figure 13: Effect of number of parallel TCP streams and bandwidth splitting strate-
gies on throughput for a GridFTP memory-to-memory data transfer over a 1 Gbps
link with 90 ms RTT.
3.4.6 Rule Provisioning Strategies
In this section we study the effects of several provisioning and bandwidth splitting
strategies on the throughput of a GridFTP memory-to-memory data transfer over a
1 Gbps link with 90 ms RTT. We consider three provisioning strategies (as described
in section 3.3.3): synchronized VLANs, unsynchronized VLANs, and coordinated
VLAN. We also consider the same bandwidth splitting strategies described in table
6. Figure 14 shows the throughput measurement results for this experiment.
Figures 14(a), 14(b), 14(c) and 14(d) shows the results for one, two, four, and
eight TCP streams per tunnel, respectively. Regardless of the provisioning or band-
width splitting strategy, the two streams per tunnels approach provides the optimal
performance, with throughput results close to the single path baseline (889.24 Mbps).
In the worst case scenario, the maximum performance loss 3.47%. In the best case
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Figure 14: Effect of provisioning and bandwidth splitting strategies on throughput
while sending a 20 GB file using GridFTP disk-to-disk over a 1 Gbps link with
90 ms RTT: (a), (b), (c), and (d) shows the results for one, two, four, and eight
TCP streams per tunnel, respectively. We observe that two streams per tunnel is
the recommended setting to achieve the optimal performance. The baseline for each
scenario is represented as a horizontal dashed line.
scenario, we measured 280 kbps above the baseline. This might look insignificant,
but in the context of a large data transfer that might last 24 hours, this means an
extra 3 MB file can be transferred. Likewise, the four streams per tunnel approach
provides close to optimal throughput results, regardless of the provisioning strategy.
On the contrary, one and eight streams per tunnel strategies provide non-optimal re-
sults for the reasons already explained in section 3.4.5, and should not be considered
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for production environments.
It is a well-known fact that OpenFlow rule provisioning add an extra delay to the
transmission of the first packet of a flow. Nevertheless, we do not observe a significant
overhead on throughput, because OpenFlow’s delay is in the order of milliseconds,
and the total transmission time for this experiment is five minutes. Furthermore,
real-world data transfers might last hours, making OpenFlow’s provisioning delays
even more negligible. Although a significant difference between the three provisioning
methods does not exist for the optimal configuration, we recommend the use of the
coordinated VLANs approach. As mentioned in section 3.3.3, the coordinated VLANs
provisioning strategy guarantees that all traffic of a single TCP flow traverses a single
L2 tunnel. This is beneficial for troubleshooting and auditing purposes. On the
other hand, the synchronized VLANs and unsynchronized VLANs are completely
reactive, and do not introduce as much delay, because each OVS reacts the packets
arriving to their interfaces. However, in the unsynchronized approach, or in the event
synchronization is lost in the synchronized approach, the forward and return traffic of
a single TCP flow might traverse two separate L2 tunnels. This situation complicates
troubleshooting and auditing for multi-path, multi-domain advance reservations.
3.4.7 Oversubscription
In this experiment we measured the improvement factor for a GridFTP memory-
to-memory data transfer, and a 20 GB GridFTP disk-to-disk data transfer over a
1 Gbps link with 90 ms RTT. From our baseline measurements, GridFTP disk-to-
disk achieves at most 733.44 Mbps of throughput using four parallel TCP streams.
Considering this observation, we hypothesize that by oversubscribing the aggregate
reservation, we will obtain a higher throughput. For instance, we oversubscribed a
1 Gbps link by requesting two L2 tunnels of 600Mbps for an aggregate of 1.2 Gbps.
Figure 15 shows the improvement factor for several percentages of oversubscription.
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We observe that with 40% to 50% oversubscription, we obtain 1.12X improvement for
GridFTP disk-to-disk, but anything below or above it produces lower improvement
factors. Furthermore, there is no significant improvement for GridFTP memory-to-
memory. For these reasons we do not recommend that the orchestrator oversubscribes
physical links in the last mile, although additional resources are available in the WAN
providers.















Figure 15: Improvement factor in GridFTP’s average throughput for oversubscrip-
tion of the physical, while maintaining multi-path, multi-domain reservations within
limits. For instance, requesting two 600 Mbps L2 tunnels for an aggregate of 1.2 Gbps
gives us 20% oversubscription on a 1 Gbps link.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented an architecture for end-to-end service orchestration in
multi-domain science networks that leverages SDXs for providing multi-path, multi-
domain advance reservations. We implemented an orchestrator for multi-path, multi-
domain advance reservations and an SDX to support these services. Our imple-
mentation uses an agent-based approach in which site agents communicate with a
centralized orchestrator that serves as a single point of contact for end users. We
developed a negotiation protocol that improves the success rate of intercontinental
multi-domain reservation from approximately 50% when using single-path circuits
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to up to 99% when four paths are available under the conditions presented in sec-
tion 3.4.3. We evaluated our solution using GridFTP, which has multiple TCP flow
splitting capability and is one of the most popular tools for data transfers in the
scientific community. In our experiments, we tested our system under several con-
ditions of bandwidth splitting ratios, SDN rule provisioning strategies, and number
of GridFTP streams, and generated recommendations for the optimal performance
of reservations. To confirm our simulation results and recommendations, we need to
deploy our architecture in an actual science data network (e.g., ESNet 100GB SDN
testbed, AtlanticWave/SDX or GENI) so as to collect real system results to confirm
our results presented here.
59
Chapter IV
NOVEL NETWORK SERVICES FOR SUPPORTING BIG
DATA SCIENCE RESEARCH
4.1 Introduction
Modern scientific instruments (e.g., particle accelerators, large telescopes, and genome
sequencers) generate enormous amounts of data. These large datasets are analyzed
at supercomputing centers, typically hundreds of kilometers away from the original
research facility. For instance, a large telescope located in the Andes mountains in
Chile, taking multiple gigabyte images to be transferred to the United States so that
processing can be completed in time to distribute transient alert notifications will use
a dedicated network connection between the two facilities. Figure 16 shows a map
of the interconnection between the Large Synoptic Survey Telescope (LSST) in Chile
and a supercomputer in the United States.
Network operators may take from days to several weeks to plan and provision a
circuit over an R&E network, because these tasks are typically done manually [56]. To
interconnect research facilities such as LSST with supercomputing centers across long
distances, network operators deploy scientific networks or Research and Education
(R&E) networks. However, the interface for requesting these types of reservations is
very complex for domain-expert scientists who are not network operators. Arguably,
many of these interfaces were developed by network operators, for network operators.
Additionally, as reservations are defined by duration and bandwidth, the scheduling
of resources is not flexible; that is, a reservation request will fail if the exact amount of
bandwidth is not available within the specified time frame, which forces the scientist
into a cycle of trial and error until a suitable time frame is found. Furthermore,
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Figure 16: Map of the interconnection between the LSST in Chile and the NCSA
supercomputer in the United States.
manual provisioning of these connections, which could take from several days to
several weeks [56], is sometimes limited by configuration overhead, poor scalability,
and poor testing interfaces [98].
To alleviate the shortcomings of current advanced reservation systems, we require
an architecture for R&E networks that allows agile programmability of end-to-end
network services over multiple domains, protects access to reservations from end-to-
end, and provides flexible reservation capabilities. In this chapter we mapped our
reference architecture (see Chapter 2) to AtlanticWave/SDX [21], an SDX controller
currently being developed by Georgia Tech and Florida International University, as
part of a multi-year project to create a distributed SDX over Sao Paulo in Brazil, and
Miami and Atlanta in the United States. The main goal of the AtlanticWave project
is to interconnect the aforementioned LSST telescope in Chile with supercomputers
in the US. We investigate how our U-O interface will allow domain-expert scientists
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and data workflow management systems to reserve network resources from a multi-
domain SDX. This work was presented at Gateways 2017 (12th Gateway Computing
Environments Conference) organized by the Science Gateways Community Institute
(SGCI) [22].
4.2 Infrastructure Assessment of a Regional Science Net-
work
In this section we present an assessment of Southern Crossroads (SoX) [95], an orga-
nization that provides high-speed, global connectivity, and other commodity services
to the Southeastern U.S. Research and Education community. We surveyed nine
network operators of participating institutions at SoX to understand their cyberin-
frastructure at a high level, and also to understand their interactions with domain
scientists. The following subsections show the responses to our questions and our
analysis of these responses.
4.2.1 What kind of science research do you support, or are you planning
to support in the future?
With this question, our goal was to understand which are the main research areas
supported by SoX participants. Bioinformatics, genomics, and systems/networking
research were mentioned at least twice. After that, we found a wide variety of topics
such as neuro imaging, particle research from the Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) at
CERN, medical research, cloud and distributed systems, and engineering modeling.
4.2.2 What applications those scientists use?
The vast majority of respondents (seven out of nine) are unaware of what applications
their scientists use. Two of them mentioned Globus as one of the applications used
by scientists. These two respondents mentioned more applications such as FTP, SCP,
GridFTP, Matlab, Galaxy Genomic pipelines, custom applications, Aspera Connect,
among others. Furthermore, one of the respondents mentioned that many of these
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scientists have their own IT staff. Nevertheless, we were able to confirm that many of
the applications used by scientists are for data movement (e.g., FTP, SCP, GridFTP,
Aspera Connect, and Globus).
4.2.3 Where are they connecting (inside and outside your network)?
Figure 17 show the answers of the participants to the question: where are they con-
necting (inside and outside your network)?, in reference to domain scientists. Inter-
estingly, most of the responses indicate that scientists connect with external academic
collaborators, then internal collaborators, and other SoX participants. Very few con-
nect with external corporate collaborators.
Figure 17: Question 3: Where are they connecting (inside and outside your network)?
We asked participants to mark all options that applied.
4.2.4 Infrastructure Questions
To better understand the cyberinfrastructure of SoX participants, we asked the fol-
lowing questions:
1. How many data transfer nodes do you host in your network?
2. Do you host a Science DMZ?
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(a) (b)
Figure 18: Infrastructure questions: (a) How many data transfer nodes do you host
in your network? And (b) do you host a Science DMZ?
3. Do you use advance reservation system or dedicated circuit?
4. How often do you provision or modify dedicated circuits?
Eight out of nine respondents host a data transfer node (DTN) in their network
(see Figure 18(a)), and six out of nine host a Science DMZ (see Figure 18(b)). Most
of the respondents use advance reservation systems, with the advanced layer 2 service
(AL2S) from Internet2 being the most popular (see Figure 19(a)). In general, network
operators only modify dedicated circuits by request (see Figure 19(b)). These results
show us that even at a regional level, bid data science research is becoming more
relevant. Moreover, as the size of data sets increases and more external academic
partnerships are established, there will be an increase demand of science network
services.
4.3 AtlanticWave/SDX Architecture
As big data science research becomes more global, the need for science network ser-
vices increases. In this section we present the high-level architecture of AtlanticWave/SDX,
and the science gateway interfaces that allow domain-expert scientists to request net-
work resources. The proposed AtlanticWave/SDX architecture is composed of the
following components (see Figure 20):
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Figure 19: Infrastructure questions: (a) Do you use advance reservation system or
dedicated circuit? And (b) how often do you provision or modify dedicated circuits?
1. Local controllers and local switches that reside at SDX domains (equivalent to
the site controllers described in section 2.1).
2. An SDX controller that interconnects participating sites (equivalent to the or-
chestrator described in section 2.2).
3. Users (e.g., domain-expert scientists or network operators) and applications
(e.g., data workflow management systems) that consume end-to-end services
composed by an SDX controller.
4.3.1 SDX User Interface
Some users of AtlanticWave/SDX are domain-expert scientists whom in most of the
cases do not have expertise in network operations, but still have to request reser-
vations to expedite their data transfers. Additionally, scientists use data workflow
management systems (e.g., Globus [45]) to automate the process of moving and shar-
ing data across research facilities.
In the proposed AtlanticWave/SDX architecture, both scientists and applications
request end-to-end science network services from the SDX controller by using the
Network Service Science Gateway (mapped to our U-O interface, section 2.3.2) that
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Figure 20: High-level architecture for AtlanticWave/SDX, with local controllers at
three domains, and an SDX controller exposing services to users (e.g., domain-expert
scientists, network operators, and data workflow management systems).
interfaces with and abstracts network infrastructure details. The SDX user interface
allows a scientist or a data workflow management system to request services from
AtlanticWave/SDX. To overcome rigid interfaces that only allow users to request a
certain amount of bandwidth during a limited amount of time, we propose to describe
a request based on data set size and a deadline for finishing the transfer. Details of
the network parameters should be left for the SDX controller to decide. A domain-
expert scientist, for example an astrophysicist, only wants to transfer X amount of
gigabytes before a certain deadline. The SDX user interface may include negotiation
capabilities that allow the SDX controller to provide an optimal solution to a user
request, given the user constraints and the network state. Table 7 illustrates both a
reservation request for a network operator of the AtlanticWave/SDX, and a request for
a domain-expert scientists request in JSON format, and how the SDX user interface
abstracts the complexities of the network for the experimenters.
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Table 7: SDX user request samples in JSON format
















4.3.2 Authentication and Authorization
Authentication and authorization are important topics in the AtlanticWave/SDX
architecture. The SDX controller authenticates participant entities and users or ap-
plications coming from several independent administrative domains. Then, the SDX
controller requires authorization before it issues any provisioning requests to partic-
ipant domains. Digital certificates may be used for mutual authentication between
the SDX controller and local controllers, and a federated identity management system
(e.g., Shibboleth [94]) may be used for the SDX controller to authenticate users and
applications. Another approach may be to integrate AtlanticWave/SDX with exist-
ing systems such as Globus. Under these models, users are not required to have an
account at each location, but they are authenticated using their institutional creden-
tials. We propose to enforce authorization by installing policies on each entity (i.e.,
participant R&E networks) that define what users are allowed to do, depending on
their roles or affiliation (e.g., institution, project, or individual).
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4.4 Use Cases
4.4.1 Simplifying Current Science Network Services
Astronomers use instruments that generate sets of data on the scale of gigabytes,
and they need to transfer these sets of data in a few seconds to be processed in a
remote facility. To guarantee a high-throughput network connection between facil-
ities, an experimenter may reserve network resources through AtlanticWave/SDX.
After verifying the domains involved in this end-to-end network service, the SDX
controller (see Fig. 20) contacts each local controller (using an equivalent of our D-O
Interface, section 2.3.1), querying whether a path with the constraints specified by
the experimenter is possible. Each queried domain does not have global knowledge
about the end-to-end path, but they can commit to guarantees of their portion of the
end-to-end path. The SDX controller then evaluates whether a path that meets the
end-to-end requirements can be formed. Otherwise, the SDX controller will try to
find an alternative path, or will try to negotiate a path with alternative constraints.
4.4.2 Future Generation Science Network Services
The proposed AtlanticWave/SDX architecture will allow science networks to provide
more flexible services. For instance, let us consider an experimenter who wants to
move telescope data every morning at 6:00 AM. Instead of reserving a dedicated
connection for the experiment (that could last years), the scientific network may
expose a bandwidth calendaring service in which the experimenter selects at what
hours of the day she will need the reservation. We could take this use case one
step further by correlating weather data with previous data transfer patterns, and
suggest to the experimenter the optimal time frames for upcoming data transfers.
For example, on a cloudy day, AtlanticWave/SDX will avoid provisioning a network
reservation, as the telescope’s view was obscured by clouds.
Another example is to use machine learning (ML) on data transfer patterns and
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historical reservation data to create a predictive reservation service. In this case,
the SDX will suggest a predefined reservation to an experimenter based on previous
reservation and real usage patterns. The experimenter will be able to confirm or
decline the reservation. A more aggressive approach is to provision the reservation
with a lower priority, and wait for traffic to be sensed on the network. If no traffic is
sent before a preset threshold, the reservation is eliminated.
In another scenario, a dataset is hosted in several locations. An experimenter
only needs to know the name of the needed dataset. The SDX user interface of
AtlanticWave/SDX will locate the closest repository and request a dedicated network
connection between the repository facility and the experimenter’s facility. Moreover, if
the closest facility to the experimenter is congested, AtlanticWave/SDX may negotiate
a more distant facility with better network conditions to provide the data set. We
could take this example one step further and expose an energy efficiency score, and the
SDX controller may be able to compose end-to-end green paths as a novel scientific
network service.
4.5 AtlanticWave/SDX Prototype
In this section we present the prototype of the AtlanticWave/SDX controller [33], and
how this matches with our reference architecture (Chapter 2.) AtlanticWave/SDX is
written in Python, using the Ryu SDN Framework [84] as an OpenFlow [75] speaker,
and has a REST API and web application for management. The controller is di-
vided into three components, that will run at the initial three locations of the pro-
totype (i.e., Atlanta, Miami, and Sao Paulo). The main three components of the
AtlanticWave/SDX controller are the following:
• Participant Interface(s): The participant interfaces are where network op-
erators and scientists install rules that dictate how network flows behave. This
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Figure 21: AtlanticWave/SDX Web portal for requesting science network services:
(a) network operator view, and (b) domain-expert scientist view.
interface corresponds to the network science service gateway described in Sec-
tion 4.3, and the U-O Interface described in Section 2.3.2. For the initial pro-
totype, AtlanticWave/SDX provides a Web portal that allows users to create
and install rules (see Figure 21).
• SDX Controller: The SDX controller is responsible for authentication and
authorization of participants and local controllers, taking rules from the par-
ticipant interfaces and breaking them down into per-location rules for the local
controllers, handling federation challenges from many participants installing
rules on a shared network, and providing an interface for the participants. This
is the equivalent of the orchestrator in our reference architecture (see Section
2.2)
• Local Controllers: Each location in the AtlanticWave/SDX will have a local
controller that controls the local switch(es). The local controller has one main
job: take the abstract rules from the SDX controller, and translate them to a
switch friendly protocol (e.g., OpenFlow). The local controller also bootstraps
the configuration of the switch to establish connectivity between the local con-
troller and the SDX controller. This is an instantiation of our Site controllers
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in Section 2.1.
We implemented Shibboleth from Internet2 for handling authentication at the
front end of the AtlanticWave/SDX controller. It is important to note that Shib-
boleth is not used outside of North America. As a result, other identity and access
management (IAM) systems need to be tested. For example, eduGAIN [41], devel-
oped by GEANT, is the standard cross-domain IAM system used outside of North
America.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented an interface that allow domain scientists and data work-
flow management systems to reserve resources of a scientific network. We assessed the
cyberinfrastructure of SoX by surveying nine network operators of participant insti-
tutions. From our survey, we observed that even at a regional level, big data science
research is becoming more relevant, and scientist will require more science network
services as they collaborate with more external partners. We mapped the components
of our reference architecture to AtlanticWave/SDX, an existing SDX controller. The
AtlanticWave/SDX controller exposes network services that domain scientists and
data workflow management systems can easily consume through the user/application
interface. We provided use cases that illustrate how domain-expert scientists can use
the interfaces of AtlanticWave/SDX for easily requesting end-to-end network services.
Furthermore, we proposed future generation science network services such as band-
width calendaring, predictive reservation services, and green path reservation. We
also described the initial prototype of the AtlanticWave/SDX controller, with special
emphasis on the user/application interface, and the authentication mechanism of the
AtlanticWave/SDX Web portal. A logical next step for this work would be to conduct
science data network user studies to determine if the interface we implemented is in
fact easier to use and more intuitive than the previous interfaces.
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Chapter V
AUDITING AND ACCESS CONTROL FOR
SOFTWARE-DEFINED EXCHANGES
5.1 Introduction
Recently, users and operators of Research and Education (R&E) networks have been
looking for ways to allow multiple independent administrative domains to share com-
puting, storage, and networking resources in an agile and programmatic way. By tak-
ing advantage of virtualization of computing and storage resources, software-defined
networking (SDN), and software defined radio (SDR), researchers are building a new
kind of cyberinfrastructure referred to as software-defined infrastructure (SDI) [88].
A central point of the SDI is a software-defined exchange (SDX), a meet-me point
or marketplace where independent administrative domains can exchange computing,
storage, and networking resources. The SDX also provides enhanced visibility over
individual data streams along with control over those streams. Moreover, they can
be customized to support specific workflows of domain science research.
Taking into account the resources exchanged (e.g., computing, storage, and net-
working), the spectrum of categories for an SDX ranges from networking exchanges to
cloud-service exchanges [20]. A specialized instance of a network SDX is a software-
defined Internet exchange point [49]. This type of SDX allows participants of an
Internet exchange point (IXP) to configure networking policies in the fabric of the
IXP by using SDN technologies. Similarly, R&E exchange points are introducing
SDN in their infrastructure to allow network operators to provision network policies
over multiple independent administrative domains [56, 21]. The goal in this case is to
automate the provisioning of existing networking services in research and education
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networks such as advanced reservation of Layer-2 circuits and to enable new services
such as the interconnection of SDN islands.
The federated nature of R&E exchange points is based on trust between par-
ticipant domains. However, an old adage says “trust, but verify”, so a responsible
network operator wants to verify if his or her policies have been enforced by the SDN
domains participating on an SDX. Moreover, some participants of the SDX do not
want to reveal internal topology information while still proving that they correctly
deployed the requested policies. For these reasons, we propose FAS (Federated Au-
diting for SDX) [19], a federated auditing framework that allows an SDX to verify the
following conditions: (1) whether configurations requested are correctly enforced by
participant SDN domains, (2) whether configurations requested are correctly removed
after their expiration time, and (3) whether configurations exist that are performing
non requested actions. Furthermore, these verifications are conducted without reveal-
ing internal information about the participating SDN domains, and regardless of the
multi-domain architecture used.
Another challenge of these cyberinfrastructures is that advance network reserva-
tion systems identify each connection by coarse-grained attributes such as endpoints
(e.g., an IP address or an interface of a WAN border router), requested bandwidth,
the start time, and the end time [98]. However, a major problem with using such
coarse-grained attributes to identify a network reservation is that an unauthorized
user or application behind the point of ingress could consume the reservation, af-
fecting the performance of legitimate users or applications. We present here a novel
network architecture that provides advance reservation access control by leveraging
SDN and token-based authorization.
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• A federated auditing framework for configuration verification in an SDX and
a communication protocol that allows an SDX to query participant domains
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without exposing internal information.
• A system that uses SDN and tokens to strongly bind an end-to-end flow to the
user or application that requested the reservation.
5.2 Federated Auditing for Software-Defined Exchanges (FAS)
5.2.1 Background
Federated Auditing Systems
A federation is a group of independent networked systems that share and exchange
data under standardized agreements. The best example of a federated system is the
Internet, and one of its most challenging problems is to diagnose routing problems. To
make this task easier, Teixeira and Rexford [97] proposed Omni, a distributed system
that uses passive measurements of BGP changes inside an autonomous system (AS),
and allows ASs involved in a route change to collaborate in identifying problems.
Similarly, Shanmugasundaram et al. proposed ForNet [92], a distributed network
logging mechanism that aids digital forensics over wide area networks. Both Omni
and Fornet have local servers that collect network information within the domain or
AS. These servers then cooperate to identify a routing problem or a cyberattack for
Omni and Fornet respectively.
Security Considerations for SDXs
SDN provides programmability and agility in network operations by centralizing the
control plane. Moreover, this centralized control allows SDNs to dynamically alter
network topology, routing, and even security policies on the fly. However, this central-
ization also introduces new attack vectors. For instance, anyone gaining access to the
controller software essentially gains the keys to the kingdom, and thus, gains control
over the entire network [65]. Likewise, forged or spoofed traffic flows can potentially
be used to fool switches and controllers into installing erroneous or malicious flow
rules [65]. Other concerns involve attacks against the control plane communication
74
itself and assurance of trust between controller and management applications. Of
course in the context of multi-domain SDNs, the problem of finding SDN misconfigu-
rations is similar to troubleshooting a routing problem in the Internet or conducting
a forensic investigation over multiple domains.
To illustrate an attack scenario, let us consider a centralized SDX, in which an
SDX controller orchestrates various SDN controllers in separate domains. The SDX
controller must trust participating SDN controllers to deploy requested configura-
tions on their respective domains. In this scenario, a compromised participant SDN
controller or a malicious or uncooperative network operator might ignore the config-
uration request from the SDX controller or install malicious or incorrect flow rules
in their corresponding data plane that puts network traffic from other participating
domains at risk. For instance, a malicious participant SDN controller might duplicate
and divert flows to eavesdrop on communications, alter data, or introduce man-in-
the-middle attacks against unsuspecting domains. We assume that the switches in
the data plane are trusted and have not been compromised by an attacker.
The NSF report from the workshop on software-defined infrastructure (SDI) and
software-defined exchanges (SDX) [88] identified network slicing as a promising way
of securing SDI and SDX. A network slice is a logical instantiation of a physical
network that provides the isolation of user traffic. The authors emphasize that to
achieve secure slicing, SDX slices should incorporate admission control, secure slice
provisioning, unforgeable slice identifiers across domains, and verification and audit-
ing mechanisms. This also assumes that SDN controllers are capable of isolating and
microsegmenting network applications and possess the ability to build dynamic access
control lists (ACLs) [90]. Despite the isolation provided by SDX slices, a compromised
participant SDN controller could still install malicious rules in its data plane. Thus
there is a need for auditing that allows the SDX controller to verify the correctness
of configurations deployed by each participant domain.
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5.2.2 System Architecture
A federated auditing system for an SDX should allow the verification of the following
conditions: (1) whether configurations requested to the SDX are correctly enforced by
participant SDN domains, (2) whether configurations requested are correctly removed
after their expiration time, and (3) whether configurations exist that are performing
non requested actions. Additionally, these verifications should be conducted without
revealing internal information about the participant SDN domains to the SDX. Fi-
nally, the auditing system must be separated from the domain-SDN controller (equiv-
alent of the Site controller described in Section 2.1), to avoid a compromised controller
corrupting the records of the auditing system.
Considering the requirements listed in the previous paragraph, we designed the
architecture of FAS (Federated Auditing for SDX) to be agnostic of the overall multi-
domain architecture (see Fig. 22). FAS is composed of the following components:
1. Control plane auditor: An independent auditing system in each participant
SDN domain that records the communication between the SDN controller and
SDN switches.
2. Data plane auditor: An auditing system in each participant that records selected
traffic in the data plane.
3. Domain FAS agent: a module in each domain that coordinates auditing elements
(i.e., control plane and data plane auditors).
4. SDX FAS agent: a centralized auditing orchestrator at the SDX.
5. FAS protocol: a communication protocol that allows the SDX to query FAS
agents for configuration verifications, while keeping a participant’s information
undisclosed.
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Figure 22: FAS Architecture showing a participant domain, auditing system with
control plane and data plane auditors, and FAS agents communicating through the
FAS protocol. Trusted entities are depicted in green
The control plane auditor module keeps records of the communication between the
SDN controller and SDN switches within a domain. Similarly, the data plane auditor
keeps a record of the data plane actions. Both control and data plane auditors may be
implemented with current technologies such as port mirroring and a Wireshark sniffer,
sFlow [91] or the Bro network security monitor [100] (implementation options will be
discussed in more detail in Section 5.3.5). The SDX FAS agent allows an SDX to query
participant domains and verify if configuration requests have been correctly enforced
after provisioning or correctly removed after expiration. The domain FAS agent allows
a participant domain to reply to these queries without revealing internal information
such as topology, address space or traffic patterns. A domain FAS agent takes the
information collected by control and data plane auditors and constructs a reply that
provides the necessary information to the SDX while maintaining internal network
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details confidentiality. Additionally, a domain FAS agent collects data plane active
flow data and compares this with control plane audit data to detect non requested
actions. Finally, the FAS protocol allows agents to establish auditing relationships
and exchange query and response messages.
Management of Federated Auditing System
We propose that the federated auditing system be managed by an SDX operator in
collaboration with participant domain network operators. The SDX operator receives
notifications from the SDX FAS agent. After receiving a notification from the SDX
FAS agent, the SDX operator contacts the network operator of the originating domain
to start a remediation process. The SDX FAS agent will test rules right after a
configuration and right after a removal for the most conservative auditing approach.
A more aggressive auditing approach will require active polling with a frequency
determined by the duration of the reservation and the accuracy required.
Trust within the FAS Architecture
Trust between FAS agents at the SDX and across participant domains is required
for the FAS architecture to work properly. Furthermore, trust between the auditing
entities and the participant domain is required. Fig. 22 depicts in green the trusted
entities of the FAS architecture, which are an extension of the SDX into participant
domains. The domain FAS agent subsystem should be deployed and managed by
SDX operators or a designated trusted point of contact from the participant domain.
Separation of roles should also be enforced. Specifically, the operator of the FAS
system should not be the same person that operates the SDN controller, as we want
to avoid collusion between these two roles, and mitigate the possibility that they
might be used to cover the tracks of malicious activity.
The FAS architecture creates a new chain of trust that follows the flow of data
depicted in Fig. 23, that starts in a control or data plane auditor and ends at the SDX
78
FAS agent. However, a domain administrator still wants to verify that the domain
FAS agent is not collecting any additional information from the domain controller
and/or switches. The SDX operator can provide read-only permission to the domain
administrator for the purpose of verifying what information is collected by a domain
FAS agent. Moreover, both parties can coordinate the installation of rules that limit
the type and amount of information that a domain FAS agent can collect. Finally,
the domain FAS agent is designed to work with the minimal necessary information for
responding to an SDX query. This design will be discussed more in detail in section
5.2.2.
FAS Protocol Design
The FAS architecture framework collects evidence of per-domain SDX configurations
and aggregates an end-to-end configuration records for verification. Fig. 23 illustrates
the flow of audit data from a single control or data plane element to the SDX FAS
agent. The FAS protocol enables the collection of configuration evidence for further
aggregation at the SDX.
The FAS protocol is composed of three types of messages: query, response, and
notification. The query message allows an SDX FAS agent to query configurations to
participant domain FAS agents; the payload contains a token representation of the
rule that the SDX wants to verify. The response message allows a domain FAS agent
to reply to SDX queries; the response is typically YES (flow rule exists), NO (flow rule
does not exist), and NOAUTH (not authorized to query this). Finally, the notification
message allows a domain FAS agent to send notification to an SDX FAS agent without
a previous query from the SDX; the payload typically contains a flow rule in violation
within the configured policy. This rule is abstracted to a domain level, in order to
avoid disclosing internal topological information, but representative enough to allow a
domain administrator to start an investigation after receiving a notification from the
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Figure 23: Flow of data in the FAS framework architecture from the control and
data plane elements to the SDX. The chain of trust of the FAS architecture follows
this flow of data
SDX operator. The correct balance between domain-level abstraction and explicitness
of the notification is out of the scope of this work.
FAS Agent Design
FAS agents are designed to collect configuration evidence and coordinate evidence
sharing over multiple domains. A domain FAS agent collects information from net-
work elements in the control and data planes, creates flow registries from the network
information collected, and replies to audit queries. Likewise, an SDX FAS agent
queries domain agents for building an end-to-end flow configuration verification.
To maintain confidentiality of internal configurations, an SDX FAS agent is only
allowed to ask if a configuration exists, and the response to this query is either yes,
no, or not authorized as shown in Section 5.2.2. The answer is then compared to
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the lifetime of the SDX request (i.e., start time and end time). If the SDX FAS
agent gets a positive answer within the lifetime of the request, the rule was properly
configured. Similarly, if the answer is negative outside the lifetime of the request, the
configuration was properly eliminated (See Algorithm 4).
Algorithm 4 Verify if configuration exists
FR← Set of domain flow rules
fr ← Flow rule to verify
if Authorized then
if fr.start time < NOW < fr.end time then















Once user traffic is detected following behavior that is different from the flow rules
requested, the data plane auditor sends a notification to the domain FAS agent. Then,
the domain FAS agent compares this information with the control plane configuration
audit. If a flow detected on the data plane does not have a counterpart configuration
in the control plane, the domain FAS agent has detected an unauthorized flow rule,
and sends a notification to the SDX FAS agent (See Algorithm 5).
FAS Workflow
Fig. 24 shows the workflow for a user configuration request and subsequent audit
verifications using the FAS framework. The detailed workflow is as follows:
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Algorithm 5 Unrecognized flow notification
FR← Set of domain flow rules
f ← New flow detected
if f ∈ FR then




1. A user requests a configuration from the SDX controller.
2. The SDX controller sends requests configurations to each participant SDN con-
troller via the SDX configuration channel.
3. Each participant SDN controller provisions its corresponding configuration in
its respective domain.
4. The SDX controller requests an audit through the SDX FAS agent. The SDX
FAS agent contacts each domain FAS agent through the FAS protocol.
5. Each domain FAS agent processes the request by analyzing its internal auditing
system, and responds to the SDX FAS agent through the FAS protocol.
6. When the configuration request expires, steps 2-5 on the workflow will be re-
peated.
5.2.3 FAS Proof-of-Concept Evaluation
To evaluate the FAS architecture, we built a proof-of-concept (PoC) testbed in the
GENI platform [9]. Our testbed, depicted in Fig. 25, is composed of two OpenFlow-
enabled Open vSwitch (OVS) [85] virtual switches connecting two hosts, a Ryu SDN
controller [84], a domain FAS agent that includes a data plane auditor, and an SDX
controller.
For our implementation, we used the NSI (network service interface) [83] protocol
as the model of an SDX configuration protocol. NSI allows users to request network
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Figure 24: FAS workflow for a user configuration request and subsequent audit
verifications using FAS
Figure 25: FAS testbed implemented on the GENI platform
services from one or more network service provider. In its most basic form, NSI allows
experimenters to establish Layer-2 circuits over multiple domains. In our PoC, an
SDX receives an end-to-end multi-domain configuration request from a user, breaks
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down this request into several configurations for the domains involved and sends
configuration requests to each domain. Each domain is in charge of implementing the
requested configuration internally, by configuring each OVS in its domain.
The end-to-end configuration audit follows the reverse process of an SDX config-
uration. In our implementation approach, we enabled a RESTful API that allows
the domain FAS agent to query the flow table of each OVS in the domain, and cre-
ates flow registries. These flow registries are then used to respond to SDX queries
by composing domain level policies. Finally, the SDX FAS agent takes each domain
response and composes an end-to-end response that verifies a configuration requested
by a user.
5.2.4 Discussion
The implementation of our PoC sheds some light on the complexity of integrating a
multi-domain auditing system as FAS. At each stage of the audit data flow, we had to
make decisions that tightly coupled our implementation of the auditing system with
the actual implementation of the networking infrastructure. For instance, the REST
API that allows a domain FAS agent to query the flow tables of domain switches
takes advantage of the ovs-ofctl dump-flows command of OVS. A better approach
is for the control plane auditor to track flow entries querying the switch directly,
out-of-band, not leveraging the same OVS commands. Similarly, the domain FAS
agent has to use the same logic used by the domain SDN controller to configure the
data plane switches, in order to compose the domain-level configuration from the
individual flows.
The FAS architecture proposes auditing of the control plane of each participant
domain. Security best practices recommend using OpenFlow transport over TLS,
which makes traffic capture challenging. Developers of off-the-shelf solution such as
Bro have not willing to implement an OpenFlow analyzer [99]. This will force the
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network operators to implement their own solution for auditing an OpenFlow-based
control plane. One possible solution is to use the code base of an SDN controller and
re-purpose it as an auditing tool. Also, SDN troubleshooting tools like OFRewind
[104] and OpenFlow Sniffer [11] could be reengineered as control plane auditors.
Regarding data plane auditing, capturing network traffic will generate enormous
amounts of data. A combination of port mirroring and network capture is not practi-
cal; it is too limited for large domains, expensive in terms of storage, while covering a
few ports. A solution similar to NetAssay [32] will alleviate these problems by allow-
ing domain FAS agents to write network filtering rules for traffic redirection. With
this approach, the data plane auditor will only capture traffic of interest to the SDX
FAS agent.
The control and data plane auditors can collect data following two methods: ac-
tive monitoring and passive monitoring. By using active monitoring, the auditor polls
networking devices for audit data, as in our PoC. On the other hand, passive moni-
toring collects data by passively capturing network traffic (e.g., a tap and a network
analyzer in the control plane). It is important to note that the current FAS archi-
tecture is not able to detect side channels, as it relies on the trust between the SDX
operator and domain administrator to set up the auditing system. Detecting side
channels within a domain is outside of the scope of this work.
5.3 Advance Reservation Access Control Using SDN and
Tokens
5.3.1 Tokens Background
A token authorization scheme can be implemented via either self-contained tokens
or opaque tokens. In the first approach, the token contains all the information to
be verified by an enforcement point. Typically, this approach requires a public key
infrastructure (PKI) for signing and verifying tokens. In the second approach, a
secure token service (STS) validates tokens. The token validation service may be
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located either at a central point with the token issuer service, or at the enforcement
point closer to the client. This approach may not need a PKI because all token
information is stored in a centralized STS. However, if the meaning of the token has
to be transferred to the enforcement point, a mechanism for secure token distribution
requires that a PKI should be in place.
5.3.2 System Architecture
Our architecture for advance reservation access control comprises an orchestrator
that handles user requests and manages networking resources, a WAN controller that
represents an advance reservation system connecting sites involved in a specific data
transfer, and a site SDN controller that manages the installation of flow rules on site
switches. The orchestrator assigns a token to each successful reservation requested
by a user, effectively creating a strong binding between the user who requested the
reservation and the flows provisioned by SDN on each site and the WAN controller.
Then, an authorized user can present this token to a site controller and gain access to
the network reservation. After a reservation expires, all configurations are removed
from the network, and the token cannot be reused. The full workflow is automated,
and no involvement from a network operator is required. Our approach does not
require any changes to current advance reservation systems. Figure 26 illustrates our
architecture and the workflow for requesting an end-to-end circuit for a data transfer,
which we describe in detail below.
The detailed workflow for requesting, provisioning, and consuming a protected
advance reservation is as follows:
1. A user requests an advance reservation through an orchestrator. The user pro-
vides reservation information: identifiers for the endpoints (e.g., hostname or IP
address) involved in the transfer, the start time, the end time, and bandwidth
requirement.
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Figure 26: Block diagram of advance reservation access control using SDN and
tokens. Only positive outcomes are shown
2. The orchestrator polls each site’s SDN controller and a WAN controller to verify
whether the bandwidth requested between the two endpoints is available during
the specified time frame, i.e., from start to end.
(a) If resources are available in every domain, each controller provisions a layer-
2 circuit within its domain and reports a VLAN ID to the orchestrator.
(Our approach will also work for layer 3 circuits.)
i. The orchestrator creates a token for the reservation and associates it
with the set of VLANs.
(b) The orchestrator replies to the user with the reservation token.
(c) If any controller does not have enough resources, the orchestrator replies
to the user with a reservation failure message.
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3. When it is time to start the data transfer, the user contacts the data mover on
the receiver site and configures it as a receiver. The communication message
includes the reservation token.
(a) The data receiver replies with the IP address and port on which it is
listening.
(b) The data receiver request the site’s SDN controller to add a flow rule
matching 3-tuple [ip addr, port, proto]. (The IP address and port of the
sender site are not known at this point.)
(c) The SDN controller validates the token against the orchestrator, which
replies with reservation VLAN if valid.
i. If valid, the controller installs the flow rule with an action send to
VLAN ID of the reservation on the site’s OVS and installs the flow
rule on the border switch to replace the site’s VLAN with the WAN’s
VLAN for outgoing traffic, and vice versa for incoming traffic.
ii. Else, it rejects the request.
4. After the IP address and port are known, the user sends a request including the
token, destination IP address, and destination port to the data sender.
(a) The data sender then sends a request to the site’s SDN controller to add
a flow rule matching the 5-tuple [src ip, dst ip, src port, dst port, proto].
The user can then send a request to the receiver site to modify the 3-tuple
to a 5-tuple flow rule.
(b) The SDN controller validates the token against the orchestrator, which
replies with a reservation VLAN if valid.
i. If valid, the controller installs a flow rule with an action of tagging
packets with a reservation VLAN on the site’s OVS and installs a
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flow rule on the border router for replacing the VLAN ID of the site
with the VLAN ID of the WAN for outgoing traffic, and vice versa for
incoming traffic.
ii. Else, it rejects the request.
5.3.3 Implementation
We conducted experiments on the ESNet infrastructure testbed. As shown in Figure
27, we used two sites, Washington DC and CERN in Geneva, Switzerland, which
have an average inter-site RTT of 90 ms and up to 10 Gbps best effort for bandwidth
capacity. Each site has two OVS switches [85], one container endpoint, and one Ryu
SDN controller [84]. The orchestrator runs on another container hosted at CERN.
All containers run Ubuntu 14.04.
As shown in Figure 26, our architecture implementation is composed of a WAN
controller, one site controller per site, one data mover node per site, an orchestrator,
and a user interface. Each component was coded in Python and communicates over
TCP sockets sending JSON data. To communicate with the Ryu controller, we used
the REST API that comes with the controller. The data transfers used iperf. The
system handles three types of messages: (1) REQ for advance reservation requests,
(2) RCV for data mover receiver configuration, and (3) SND for data mover sender
configuration. We next provide a brief description of each component.
WAN Controller
The WAN controller emulates an advance reservation system such as OSCARS (ES-
Net) or AL2S (Internet2). Its northbound interface talks to the Orchestrator, while
its southbound interface interacts with WAN switches. Its main functionality is to
manage a pool of VLANs, assign VLANs to circuit reservation requests, and provi-
sion the circuit on the WAN infrastructure (switches). A message request from the
Orchestrator has the following format:
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Figure 27: ESNet infrastructure testbed configuration for experiments
• Message Type: REQ
• Format: site1, site2, start time, end time, bandwidth
The actions performed by the WAN controller after receiving a request are assign
VLAN to the reservation, allocate bandwidth requested, and configure switches. It
may respond with the reservation VLAN ID or a failure message.
Site Controller
A site controller manages reservation configurations at its site. The site switch in Fig-
ure 26 represents the site’s topology (which could involve one or more switches) and
the border router represents a connection to the WAN. The controller’s northbound
interface talks to the orchestrator and a data mover that requests access to a reserva-
tion, while its southbound interface interacts with site switches through OpenFlow.
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The controller’s main functions are to manage a pool of VLANs, assign VLANs to
circuit reservation requests from the orchestrator, provision the circuit on the site in-
frastructure (switches), validate tokens against the orchestrator, and install flow rules
binding reservation VLAN to flow 5-tuple. A message request from the orchestrator
has the following format:
• Message Type: REQ
• Format: site1, site2, start time, end time, bandwidth
A message request from a data mover is handled by the Ryu controller’s REST API.
We extended that API to accept authorization tokens when adding new flow rules.
Data Mover
The data mover’s main function is to transfer data from one site to another. It can
work in either sender or receiver mode. It accepts commands from a user interface
and sends add flow requests to a site controller with a reservation token. In our
experiments, we use iperf to perform data transfers. To emulate GridFTP behavior
[2], the data mover receiver generates a random TCP port number before starting
the iperf server and returns the socket on which it is listening. Likewise, the sender
uses this socket to establish a connection by using iperf. A user interface can send
two types of messages to a data mover:
• RCV: generates a random port number and starts an iperf server on that port;
returns the socket [IP:port] to the user interface.
• SND: opens a connection to the socket provided by the client.
Every request acquires a reservation token. After every request, the data mover has
to present the site controller with the request’s token plus a flow to be added.
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Orchestrator
The orchestrator is in charge of coordinating the reservation of an end-to-end circuit
between two (or more) sites and validating the tokens presented by data movers to site
controllers (refer to messages 3c and 4b in Figure 26). Its northbound interface talks
to the user that requests access to a reservation; its southbound interface interacts
with SDN controllers on the WAN and on each site. A user request has the following
format:
• Message Type: REQ
• Format: site1, site2, start time, end time, bandwidth
If the orchestrator finds a path between the two sites, it will return a reservation token
to the user; otherwise, a failure message will be sent. A token validation request from
a data mover has the following format:
• Message Type: TKN
• Format: Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) v4, a 128-bit-long identifier stan-
dard defined in RFC 4122
The orchestrator will reply with a valid or invalid token message depending on the
existence of a token in its token store.
5.3.4 Evaluation
We evaluated the system on the ESNet 100G SDN testbed by measuring its latency
in answering a request with three token validation schemes (i.e., opaque token at or-
chestrator, self-contained token, and opaque token with enforcement point validation
(EPV)). Figure 28 shows that advanced reservation requests (REQ messages) take
around 350 ms. The main factor for this latency is the 2PC protocol that adds a
second round of messages to the request. To verify this, we measured that a circuit
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Figure 28: Latency of the system for opaque, self-contained, and enforcement point
token validation (EPV).
reservation request takes around 182 ms on average for a system without 2PC, which
translates into a 52% overhead. It is important to note that our proof-of-concept im-
plementation does not consider path computation and resource scheduling functions,
because these functions are outside the scope of our study.
For messages that require token validation (i.e., RCV and SND messages), the
self-contained and enforcement point validation approaches have a lower latency than
the opaque token with centralized validation when messages are sent over the WAN.
Figure 28 shows that the opaque token approach takes around 375 ms, while the
self-contained and enforcement point validation approaches take around 200 ms in
this scenario. Nevertheless, for requests that stay in close proximity, all three token
validation schemes have a latency of 20 ms. It is important to note that token
validation happens per request (i.e., a 5-tuple connection that can be used to transfer
all the files in a single data transfer), although in our proof-of-concept implementation
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we need to install four flows per switch, per request—where two flows represent the
incoming and outgoing traffic for the data transfer and the other two are for ARP
requests—for a total of 4N flow rule installation request for a site with N OpenFlow
switches. After installing all corresponding flows on each switch, we were able to
verify that only the specific iperf3 connection was able to communicate between the
two endpoints.
Throughput and Latency Measurements
The traffic model we used is based on the Biological and Environmental Research
(BER) network requirements review of 2015 [27] that states scientists will require to
transfer 20 GB of data in less than 5 minutes (i.e., 533.33 Mbps of throughput per
file). To measure throughput and latency performance, we evaluated the behavior of
two flows between our two sites with and without token access control. In each of the
two scenarios listed below, we measured the throughput and RTT using iperf3 with
the results shown in Figures 29 and 30, respectively:
Scenario 1: A reservation of 4 Gbps is manually extended to the endpoint using
VLANs. This creates an interface in the endpoint that is available to all users. As a
result, unauthorized users in the same endpoint still have access to the reservation.
Scenario 2: The reservation is programmatically extended to the endpoint, and
access is controlled by using our system. In this scenario only the authorized user
(i.e., the user who made the reservation) can access the 4 Gbps reservation, while
unauthorized users consume the remaining 1 Gbps available on the 5 Gbps inter-site
link.
For scenario 1, we used iperf3 to transfer a 20 GB file from the endpoint at
CERN to an iperf3 server running at Washington. The authorized flow, depicted in
blue in Figure 29(a) consumed around 1 Gbps of the available bandwidth, while the
unauthorized flow, depicted in orange in Figure 29(a) consumed around 3 Gbps.
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(a) (b)
Figure 29: Throughput measurements while sending a 20 GB file using iperf3 with
CUBIC TCP: (a) scenario 1 shows two flows sharing the 4 Gbps reservation, while (b)
scenario 2 implements our access control solution using SDN and tokens, where the
authorized flow has exclusive access to the 4 Gbps reservation and the unauthorized
flow uses the remaining 1 Gbps available on the 5 Gbps link
(a) (b)
Figure 30: RTT measurements while sending a 20 GB file using iperf3 with CUBIC
TCP. Both (a) scenario 1 and (b) scenario 2 present RTT measurements that range
between 89 and 100 ms
For scenario 2, we generated the same type of data transfer. However, this time
the authorized flow was protected by our SDN with token access control mechanism.
Our system installs specific flow rules after receiving a valid token, allowing the autho-
rized flow to use the 4 Gbps reservation. With this configuration, the authorized data
transfer, depicted in blue in Figure 29(b) reported around 3.9Gbps, while the unau-
thorized data transfer depicted in orange in Figure 29(b) reported around 0.9 Gbps.
Considering the flow installation latency of our system, which in the worst case sce-
nario (i.e., RCV/SND message over the WAN) is 200 ms configuration, our system
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only introduced a 0.40 % latency overhead to the data transfer.
Figure 30 shows the RTT measurements obtained from iperf3 during the data
transfers. For both scenario 1 (Figure 30(a)) and scenario 2 (Figure 30(b)), the
minimum RTT is around 89 ms and the maximum RTT is 100 ms, with an average
of 91 ms for all the experiments conducted. These results show that our solution has
no impact on path latency, because tokens are not validated by the data plane, but
by the control plane and only before the data transfer starts.
5.3.5 Discussion
Our findings demonstrated that our architecture reduces the provisioning time of an
end-to-end circuit from several days (manual process) to a few minutes (automated
process). Additionally, we demonstrated that, by using tokens, a specific flow can be
strongly associated with the owner of the reservation. For a real deployment, however,
many of our design decisions for this proof-of-concept should be optimized.
As we can observe in Figure 28, self-contained token and enforcement point vali-
dation approaches reply 150 ms faster to a client request than does an opaque token
approach, because validation happens on the enforcement point. We note, however,
that in this work we used a preshared password between the orchestrator and site
controller, whereas a full PKI should be used in a real deployment. Moreover, in this
work we assumed that a secure mechanism for token distribution was in place, and
we were not concerned with token spoofing attacks.
We chose to extend the RESTful API of the Ryu controller to validate each add
flow request with an authorization token. However, this approach generates too many
messages between a site controller and the orchestrator, because each add flow request
needs to be validated. An API that validates a single request but installs all required
flows at once would be more efficient.
96
5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we proposed FAS, a federated auditing framework that allows an
SDX to verify whether the configurations requested by a user are correctly enforced
by participating SDN domains, whether the configurations requested are correctly
removed after their expiration time, and whether configurations exist that are per-
forming non requested actions. Additionally, FAS allows end-to-end configuration
verification without revealing internal information of the participant SDN domains
that they are not willing to share. FAS establishes a new chain of trust by extending
auditing capabilities of the SDX into participant SDN domains, and establishes trust
agreements between SDX operators and domain administrators.
We presented an initial proof-of-concept architecture of FAS, implemented on
the GENI platform, and discussed the administrative and technical challenges of
implementing FAS. For instance, the use OpenFlow over TLS transport represents a
major challenge for collecting control plane data. Similarly, bulk data plane traffic
collection will require enormous amounts of storage.
We also proposed a system that provides end-to-end advance reservation access
control. By using multi-domain SDN orchestration and token-based authorization,
our system strongly binds an end-to-end flow to the user or application that requested
the reservation. We have deployed this system in the ESNet 100G SDN testbed, and
demonstrated that our solution effectively protects authorized flows from competing
traffic in the network. Furthermore, the provisioning time of an end-to-end reser-
vation can be reduced from several days (manually) to minutes (automated) on a
small scale network. Moreover, the provisioning latency of our system introduces
a negligible overhead (approx. 0.40%) on a large data transfer transmission time.
These results opens new possibilities for future advance reservation systems in which
advance reservations can be more flexible and short-lived (i.e., lasting hours instead




The thesis statement of this dissertation is the following: “Given that current ad-
vance reservation systems present several challenges for deploying multi-domain in-
tercontinental circuits, this work posits that by introducing SDXs in the reservation
and provisioning process of intercontinental circuits, we are able to create multi-path,
multi-domain advance reservations, which enhances the performance of science data
transfers over traditional methods reported in the literature, while increasing the suc-
cess rate of reservations, providing more intuitive interfaces to end users, and enabling
auditing capabilities to network operators.”
Our initial investigation reveals that no existing architecture is capable of provid-
ing multi-path, multi-domain advance reservations. Hence, we propose a new archi-
tecture for multi-domain advance reservations that uses SDXs as an interconnection
point for enabling multiple paths between any two locations. Our architecture is
composed of site, WAN, and SDX controllers that reside in each participant domain,
an orchestrator that composes multi-path, multi-domain advance reservations, and
the interfaces that allow users to request science network services to the orchestrator
and those that allow the orchestrator to request individual services to participant
domains.
To prove the thesis statement, we evaluated our architecture by simulation and
by running experiments on a physical testbed. Our simulation results show that a
full deployment of our architecture with four path available achieves a reservation
success rate of 99%, compared to a 50% success rate of traditional (single-domain,
single-path) advance reservation systems. The conditions under which this result was
98
obtained were presented in section 3.4.3. In our simulations, we assume that a tradi-
tional advance reservation succeeds if the available bandwidth for a timeslot is greater
than the requested bandwidth. By running experiments in GENI, we demonstrated
that the system latency of our orchestrator remains below one second when we use
gRPC as the communication channel between one orchestrator and eight participant
domains with 300 ms RTT between them. In our physical testbed, we demonstrated
that common in use scientific data transfer tools such as GridFTP can take advantage
of our multi-path, multi-domain advance reservation by measuring network through-
put performance under several bandwidth splitting scenarios. We also proposed an
interface that allows domain expert scientists to request science network services from
our orchestrator and left a user study for future work. Finally, we proposed frame-
works for auditing and access control is SDXs. We implemented a proof-of-concept
of our auditing framework in the GENI platform. Similarly, we evaluated our access
control system in the ESNet 100G SDN testbed, and demonstrated that our solution
effectively protects authorized flows from competing traffic in the network. For future
work, the orchestration and auditing framework still needs to be tested on large scale
real deployments.
6.1 Discussion
6.1.1 Orchestrating International Advance Reservations with Software-
defined Exchanges
Advance Reservation Systems and SDN - Ibarra et al. [56] deployed SDN
and OpenFlow on the AmLight international research and education network, with
the goals of improving operations efficiency and providing network programmabil-
ity. Although SDN Amlight also automates provisioning of multi-domain network
reservations, its definition of a domain is a countrywide network. In contrast, we also
consider smaller domains such as national laboratories and university campuses, as we
are also concerned with automating provisioning for the last mile between the border
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router and the endpoint. Furthermore, the SDN Amlight approach only provisions
single-path, multi-domain reservations, while our orchestration architecture provides
multi-path, multi-domain capabilities.
Tepsuporn et al. [98] tested the use of end-to-end layer 2 paths for large dataset
transfers over an existing deployment called DYNES (Dynamic Network System)
[109], which uses OESS and OSCARS in multiple domains to establish dedicated
these layer 2 paths. The authors identified limitations with configuration overhead,
scalability, path provisioning, and testing. For instance, a failed path setup attempt
in OSCARS forces a user to wait 15 minutes before issuing a new request [98]. Our
user interface and negotiation protocol eliminates this blocking time by allowing the
orchestrator to negotiate the allocation of science network resources among partici-
pant domains.
Lark [108] enables network resource management with per-job granularity for high-
throughput computing (HTC) systems such as HTCondor, using Linux containers,
virtual Ethernet devices, and SDN. In their architecture, each job is assigned to a
separate network namespace [69], and each HTCondor node has a virtual switch (e.g.,
Open vSwitch (OVS) [85] or Linux bridge) that interconnects network namespaces to
physical interfaces. To demonstrate these capabilities, the developers of Lark created
a bandwidth management system and a job-aware OpenFlow controller, measuring
performance overhead for both implementations. The authors reported one second
overhead per job, to create and configure network namespaces—a negligible delay
since a typical HTC job duration is measured in hours. However, their work considers
only jobs running on a single node, whereas our work focuses on the orchestration of
network resources in multiple sites. Attaching a Lark node to a system running our
architecture will enable job-level granularity in our orchestration framework. Lark
and our proposed system are complementary.
The Developing Applications with Networking Capabilities via End-to-end SDN
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(DANCES) [52] project seeks to enhance the performance of cyberinfrastructure ap-
plications (e.g., GridFTP [2] data transfers, SLASH2 [86] distributed file system data
transfers, and SCP) by adding network bandwidth scheduling via SDN. The project
developed a bandwidth manager, the Centralized OpenFlow and Network Governing
Authority (CONGA), whose main function is to receive bandwidth requests from a
resource manager or scheduling system and determine if the request can be fulfilled.
CONGA accepts a request if: (1) resources are available on the network and (2) the
user is authorized to request this amount of bandwidth. Although DANCES uses
SDN for provisioning, their work remains as a single-path, single-domain platform.
Multi-domain SDN Architectures - Avallone et al. [4] proposed an architec-
ture for network resource management in multi-domain scenarios using service-level
specifications, while Kempf et al. [61] proposed service provider SDN (SP-SDN), an
approach to rapid and flexible cross-domain service creation that complements SDN
and network function virtualization (NFV). Likewise, the ONF has proposed trans-
port SDN (T-SDN) [59] as a way to simplify transport network operations by allowing
a domain to expose network services (topology, connectivity, path computation, vir-
tual network, and notification service) that will be consumed by external domains.
Similarly, the Metro Ethernet Forum (MEF) has proposed the Third Network [76]
initiative to promote network as a service principles in industry, and the IETF is
working on a draft document for the Abstraction and Control of Transport Net-
works (ACTN) [30] use cases related to Packet and Optical Integration (POI). Our
architecture builds upon concepts proposed by SP-SDN, T-SDN, Third Network, and
ACTN, and adapts them to the special necessities of science networks and SDXs. We
demonstrated an agent-based approach in which our orchestrator communicates with
agents on each participant domain. This approach allows us to control the WAN
communication channel, while participant domains can independently develop their
own science network services.
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Flexible Reservations - Balman et al. [6] developed a flexible reservation algo-
rithm for path-finding in the OSCARS system by taking advantage of user-provided
parameters such as the total volume (in bytes) and time constraints, instead of band-
width requirements. Similarly, Xiao et al. [105] proposed a two-dimensional relaxed
reservation policy for Grid computing systems that achieves higher resource utiliza-
tion and success rates (approximately 95% under low reservation rates). He et al. [53]
proposed a flexible advance reservation model for cross-domain lightpath reservations
in optical networks that can achieve a maximum reservation success rate of 84%.
Both [6] and [105] are single domain scheduling algorithms (i.e., they complement
our work when deployed inside participant domains). On the other hand, [53] is a
cross-domain approach specific for optical network. Our orchestration architecture is
technology agnostic, and our negotiation protocol provides higher success rates (ap-
proximately 99% when four paths are available) under the simulations assumptions
made in section 3.4.3.
Network Resource Negotiation - RNAP [103] and SNAP [25] are two examples
of negotiation protocols for networking and Grid computing resources, respectively.
Both are based on querying resource provider for the availability of a resource before
making a reservation. Venugopal et al. [101] proposed a negotiation mechanisms
using an alternate offers protocol for advance reservation of compute nodes in a Grid
system. We build upon the concepts of querying for resources and providing offers to
create our negotiation protocol. Furthermore, we show how our negotiation protocol
performs in a science network using SDXs.
TCP Striping - For more than 15 years researchers have been proposing ways of
striping TCP connections across multiple diverse paths for performance enhancement,
or for finding a sum of bandwidth available in a reservation system. For instance, in
2002, Hsieh et al. [54] proposed parallel TCP (pTCP), an end-to-end transport layer
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protocol that allows connections to leverage the aggregate bandwidth of multiple par-
allel paths regardless of the individual characteristics of each path. According to the
authors, pTCP can be used for bandwidth aggregation of wireless interfaces for mobile
hosts, end-to-end service differentiation, and connection striping on overlay networks.
Recently, Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [12] has emerged as a standard of the IETF and
an implementation in the Linux kernel that allows a single transport connection to
use multiple paths simultaneously. In fact, data transfer protocols (e.g. GridFTP [3])
take advantage of these ideas to implement their own TCP multistreaming capabil-
ities. The use of multiple parallel and disjoint TCP flows is not new, however how
to accomplish this in SDX-enabled science data networks is novel. Our orchestration
framework uses SDXs to provision the underlying network infrastructure that allows
TCP striping protocols achieve their full potential in Layer 2 advance reservation
environments.
Multi-path Advance Reservations - OLiMPS (OpenFlow Linklayer Multi-
Path Switching) [79] is an OpenFlow application that allows load balancing over
multiple switched paths. The authors integrated their OpenFlow application with
the OSCARS system, and tested several load-balancing algorithms on a dedicated
testbed. Likewise, Plante et al. [87] proposed a multipath extension to the OSCARS
client that enables end users to reserve multiple paths, providing session survivability
and increasing parallelism. Although similar to our work, both of these solutions are
for single-domain reservations, each one focuses on a single piece of the overall prob-
lem. While OLiMPS cares about provisioning OpenFlow rules, Plante’s work is more
concerned with the scheduling aspect of the problem. Furthermore, Plante’s work as-
sumes identical bandwidth demands for every parallel virtual circuit (i.e., all advance
reservation requests are equal to the original user request). We provide a bandwidth
splitting service that makes more efficient use of network resources, instead of re-
questing the same bandwidth in all available paths. Furthermore, our multi-domain
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architecture is easily adaptable to single domain scenarios as those proposed by [79]
and [87].
6.1.2 Novel Network Services for Supporting Big Data Science Research
Researchers have already proposed the use of SDN for enhancing scientific applica-
tion resource management and performance over a WAN connection. For instance,
the Lark project [108] proposed a flexible and fine-grained mechanism to manage
network resources in high-throughput computing (HTC) systems [7]. Similarly, the
DANCES project uses SDN to enhance scientific application resource management
and performance of a WAN connection by developing applications with networking
capabilities via end-to-end SDN [52]. However, these solutions do not provide inter-
faces that allow domain-expert scientists to request scientific data transfer services
abstracting network details. While the Lark project built an SDN controller that
allows scheduling of high-throughput computing (HTC) jobs in a HTCondor system
[39], the DANCES project uses the same abstraction of endpoints, start time, end
time, and requested bandwidth that current science network reservation systems use.
Our architecture proposes to provide abstractions that enable domain-expert scien-
tists to request end-to-end services on scientific networks while hiding the details of
the network. Furthermore, Lark and DANCES focus on single-domain SDN, while
our solution focuses on multi-domain science networks.
Inside the SDN community, members are aligned with the development of intent-
based networking interfaces [14, 66] that use a prescriptive rather than descriptive
approach to network configuration; that is, network operators and applications de-
scribe a goal, and the SDN controller decides how to implement it. Within the
research community, Kiran et al. [62] proposed the iNDIRA (Intelligent Network
Deployment Intent Renderer Application) tool [62], which uses natural language pro-
cessing to capture the network service requirements of the user. iNDIRA has been
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deployed on the Energy Science Network (ESNet), where it interacts with Globus
data transfer tools. Similarly, the SDX user interface of AtlanticWave/SDX seeks to
implement intents by describing the network services in a high level language, and
enabling negotiation between the SDX and local controllers.
6.1.3 Auditing and Access Control for Software-Defined Exchanges
Multi-domain SDN Auditing - The closest work to our federated auditing for
software-defined exchanges is AudIt, a multi-domain SDN auditing system proposed
by Maldonado-Lopez et al. [71] which identifies whether an origin policy has been
enforced by foreign domains. The AudIt architecture comprises four main elements:
(1) a model of the network topology, policies, and flows; (2) the AudIt protocol
for gathering information about the configuration deployed on an external domain;
(3) a validation engine for detecting policy violations; and (4) an extension to the
OpenFlow protocol to enable external auditing. The AudIt protocol works by sending
related flow tables to an origin domain every time an external switch receives an AudIt
packet. Although this architecture can verify if an external policy has been enforced
in less than one second, and it can prove if an external policy has been violated in
1.5 seconds, the auditing system is tightly integrated to the SDN controller. This
means that an attacker that compromised the SDN controller would also compromise
the auditing system. Moreover, this architecture requires the modification of SDN
switches and the OpenFlow protocol. FAS on the other hand works as a third party
auditor of the SDN infrastructure, and requires no changes to OpenFlow.
Single-domain SDN Auditing - In single-domain SDN, many researchers have
proposed the use of packet histories or network traffic statistics for network diagnosis.
NetSight [51] is an extensible platform that captures packet histories and enables
applications to retrieve histories of interest by using a regex-like language called packet
history filter (PHF). To assemble packet histories, NetSight uses postcards, which are
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event records created whenever a packet traverses a switch and contains the packet
header, switch ID, output ports and version number of the switch forwarding state.
Similarly, FlowMon [60] detects compromised switches through real-time analysis of
network traffic statistics collected by OpenFlow in an SDN controller. To achieve
its goal, FlowMon extends an SDN controller with two extra functional blocks: a
malicious switch detection and prevention (MSDP) block and a policy block. While
MSDP continually and transparently analyzes communication between the controller
and switches, the policy block contains a set of rules enforced whenever a malicious
switch is detected. Contrary to NetSight and Flowmon, packet trackeback [107] takes
advantage of the global view of SDN controller to analyze the policy at the controller,
rather than monitoring the data plane. Our federated auditing for software-defined
exchanges is based upon ideas from the single-domain SDN monitoring and extends
them to federated auditing for SDX.
Federated Auditing - Federated auditing has also been proposed in areas out-
side SDN and SDX. ForNet [92], a federated forensics system, is composed of two
functional components: a synopsis appliance called SynApp, and a forensic server
that manages a set of SynApps within an administrative domain. The SynApp ap-
pliance is designed to summarize and remember network events in its vicinity. The
architecture of ForNet is hierarchical, with all SynApps within a domain associated
with a centralized forensic server of that domain. Forensic servers can be networked
for inter-domain collaboration that forms the second level of the hierarchy. Likewise,
Omni [97] is a passive measurement tool for diagnosing routing problems in the Inter-
net. The Omni architecture requires an Omni server per AS that constructs a com-
prehensive view of its routing system. ASes involved in a routing change cooperate
for pinpointing the problem. If an AS needs to contact an Omni server in other ASes,
the Omni server sends a query that follows the forwarding path. Although, Fornet
and Omni identify the necessity of cooperation between domains, both architectures
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overlook the desire of exchanging audit data without revealing internal information
of the participant domains, which most network operators are not willing to share.
SDN-based Access Control - Network access control (NAC), standardized as
IEEE 802.1X [57], is a common computer security approach to authenticate endpoints
and grant access to a computer network. NAC was an early SDN application, with
the main focus being policy enforcement. Casado et al. [16] proposed a Secure Archi-
tecture for the Networked Enterprise (SANE), which defines a single protection layer
that governs all routing and access control decisions in the network. Similarly, Nayak
et al. [78] proposed Resonance, a system for securing enterprise networks by using
dynamic access control policies and network devices as enforcement points. FlowNAC
[74] and FlowIdentity [106] adapt IEEE 802.1X by using SDN principles. FlowNAC
performs authorization by a set of predefined flow rules per network service, whereas
FlowIdentity enforces a policy through a stateful role-based firewall that is updated
dynamically at the SDN controller. These studies were all conducted in a single do-
main, such as a campus or enterprise network. Our system builds upon these ideas
and extend them to multi-domain science networks.
Token-based Access Control - Gommans et al. [46] proposed a token-based
access control mechanism for multidomain lightpath (i.e., a fiber optics path) REN
reservations. They identified and demonstrated three ways to enforce access control
policies by using tokens: at the IP packet layer, by using a token-base switch; at
the control plane, by including a token in a specific field of the resource reserva-
tion protocol - traffic engineering (RSVP-TE) signaling protocol for networks based
on generalized multiprotocol label switching (GMPLS); and at the service layer sig-
naling, by implementing an authentication, authorization, and accounting server, a
token enforcement point, and a lightpath resource allocation system. However, while
this work extended to multiple domains, it did not consider SDN. The originality of




The contributions in each chapter are summarized as follows:
1. Chapter 3 presented the design, implementation, and evaluation of our archi-
tecture for intercontinental multi-domain, multi-path advance reservations in
science networks and SDXs. The architecture is composed of an orchestrator
that request services from participant domains and SDXs, and a negotiation
protocol that allows the orchestrator to compose end-to-end services taking
advantage of alternative paths provided by the enriched connectivity of SDXs.
We evaluated our proposed architecture in a dedicated testbed using single-path
vs. multi-path advance reservations over multiple domains and the data transfer
tools that the scientific community currently uses. We demonstrated that our
orchestration framework and negotiation protocols increases the reservation suc-
cess rate from approximately 50% using single path to approximately 99% with
four paths available under the constraints specified in section 3.4.3. Chapter 3
also presents architectural approaches at the SDX level that enable novel science
network services, while enhancing the performance of science data transfers over
traditional approaches. We evaluated our solution using GridFTP, one of the
most popular tools for data transfers in the scientific community. In our exper-
iments, we tested our system under several conditions of bandwidth splitting
ratios, SDN rule provisioning strategies at the edge, and number of GridFTP
streams, and generated recommendations for the optimal performance of our
system.
2. Chapter 4 proposed an intuitive interface that users and other systems can use
to request science network services from our orchestration framework. Contrary
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to current interfaces that were designed by network operators for network oper-
ators, our interface allows a domain-expert scientist to specify the size of their
datasets and a deadline for the data transfer. Then our orchestrator negotiates
a suitable advance reservation across all participant domains. We also proposed
novel science network services enabled by our proposed architecture. These pro-
posals need further work to fully evaluate their impact on existing science data
networks.
3. Chapter 5 presented a federated auditing framework (FAS) that allows an SDX
to verify whether the configurations requested by a user are correctly enforced
by participating SDN domains, whether the configurations requested are cor-
rectly removed after their expiration time, and whether configurations exist that
are performing non requested actions. Additionally, FAS allows end-to-end con-
figuration verification without revealing internal information of the participant
SDN domains that they are not willing to share. FAS establishes a new chain
of trust by extending auditing capabilities of the SDX into participant SDN
domains, and establishes trust agreements between SDX operators and domain
administrators. We presented an initial proof-of-concept architecture of FAS,
implemented on the GENI platform, and discussed the administrative and tech-
nical challenges of implementing FAS. For instance, the use OpenFlow over TLS
transport represents a major challenge for collecting control plane data. Simi-
larly, bulk data plane traffic collection will require enormous amounts of storage.
6.3 Future Research
This thesis has demonstrated that by introducing SDXs in the reservation and provi-
sioning process of multi-domain intercontinental advance reservations, we can improve
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the success rate of reservations and define novel science network services such as multi-
path bandwidth splitting across independent WAN providers, scheduled path migra-
tions that are transparent to data transfer applications, and multipoint-to-multipoint
advance reservations. However, many questions remain open regarding real deploy-
ment of orchestration systems similar to the one proposed in this thesis, and the
future implications of SDX in next generation network infrastructures. In the follow-
ing subsections we describe some of the research opportunities that science networks
SDXs and SDXs in general will enable in the future.
6.3.1 Large Scale Deployment of Science Network SDXs
In this dissertation we evaluated our orchestration system on a dedicated testbed, and
emulated the parameter of real-world science network. However, there are conditions
that are better tested on real large scale testbeds. For instance, what is the effect of
paths with different delays on the composition of multi-path, multi-domain advance
reservations? Where is the optimal placement of the orchestrator? In the case of
a distributed orchestrator, what is the best approach to maintain consistency and
consensus among replicas? How does the negotiation protocol behaves under a high
load of requests, or when multiple orchestrators compete for the same resources, and
how do site controllers will behave under these conditions?
Some of the results of this dissertation (bandwidth offers and U-O interface) have
influenced the development of the AtlanticWave/SDX controller. However, a detailed
user study is required to determine how effective and intuitive the interface really is.
We are currently involved in the definition of the roadmap of future SDX services for
the AtlanticWave/SDX project. We plan to continue to contribute to the design and
evaluation of these services as they are deployed at large scale.
Similarly, both our federated auditing for SDX (FAS) and our advance reservation
access control frameworks need to be tested in large scale deployments. One should
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evaluate the robustness of privacy mechanism in the FAS protocol, as well as new
data structures to represent network configurations from the data plane. How the
auditing system could detect side channels in the science data network infrastructure
is another area of investigation. Regarding access control, one could explore the
robustness of token approaches against spoofing.
6.3.2 Network Function Virtualization (NFV) and Programmable Data-
planes
OpenFlow has historically been considered as the main component in the implemen-
tation of SDN, and by default it was the only enabler for SDXs. However, with the
advent network function virtualization (NFV) [38], and programmable dataplanes
such as P4 [13] and the Berkeley extensible software switch (BESS) [50] we envi-
sion new types of services. For instance, we may be able to deploy security network
functions on demand at the SDX, or perform bandwidth splitting at packet level for
applications that do not use multiple TCP streams. A question that remains is how
can we realize these services at line-rate speeds in the order of tens or hundreds of
gigabits per second?
6.3.3 Other Applications for SDXs
SDX has already been proposed as a solution to mitigate distributed denial of service
(DDoS) [34]. However, how can we make several SDXs to cooperate in the task of
mitigating a global scale DDoS attack? SDXs may also be applied in new areas.
For instance, in the context of smart cities and smart communities, we have pro-
posed MetroSDX [31], a neutral network design that increases the resiliency of edge
networks and global and local services, improves isolation of network functions, and
preserves data from edge devices when they are disconnected. One might study de-




In this thesis, we studied architectural approaches to a science network SDX, and pro-
posed an orchestration system for advance reservation of multi-domain, multi-path
intercontinental links. Our orchestration system not only increases the success rate of
multi-domain intercontinental advance reservation, but also enhances the performance
of science data transfers, provides interfaces for domain scientist users, and enables
auditing and access control capabilities for network operators. First, we provided a
literature survey of advance reservation systems and SDXs. Second, we introduced a
reference architecture of our orchestration system. Third, we designed, implemented,
and evaluated our orchestration system for reservation and provisioning of multi-path,
multi-domain intercontinental advance reservations. Fourth, we proposed an interface
for domain-expert scientists to request multi-domain intercontinental advance reser-
vations on our system, adapting our reference architecture to the AtlanticWave/SDX
project and leave as future work a user study. Fifth, we proposed a federated auditing
system that allows network operators to verify that their network policies have been
correctly installed in an SDX, regardless of what architecture are they using, and an
access control system that uses SDN and tokens to strongly bind network flows to
the user who requested an advance reservation.
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